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WHEN DOES SEX DIVERSITY ON BOARDS
BENEFIT FIRMS?
Darren Rosenblum*
ABSTRACT
Firms embrace diversity, especially with regard to sex. Overtly
optimistic predictions of a diversity dividend, some built on sex stereotypes,
lead these firms to count on profits that may never materialize. This Article
attempts to reset the agenda on how to study corporate board diversity. We
can only assess if and how sex diversity yields benefits by understanding the
who, what, and where of diversity. Whether sex diversity produces a
“diversity dividend” depends on three key factors: (1) the nature of the
benefit of including women (whether for their experience or other qualities);
(2) the kind of firm and its governance; and (3) the jurisdiction(s) in which
the firm operates. Only by further investigating the precise conditions under
which diversity will have an effect can we estimate the potential instrumental
benefits of sex diversity.
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INTRODUCTION
Diversity matters; or so we’re told. Studies by management
consultants, firms, and some scholars1 assert that diversity benefits business.
Corporate diversity advocates claim that diversity propels firms toward
greater profits, share prices, and better governance. 2 Management
1. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN.
85 (2000) (Addressing how and why the business community is adopting diversity to enhance
productivity and profitability and suggesting ideas for legal and policy changes).
2. RICHARD DOBBS ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, THE POWER OF PARITY: HOW
ADVANCING WOMEN’S EQUALITY CAN ADD $12 TRILLION TO GLOBAL GROWTH (MCKINSEY &
COMPANY 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/growth/how_advancing_womens_equ
ality_can_add_12_trillion_to_global_growth [https://perma.cc/4DJP-8ANX] [hereinafter
POWER OF PARITY] (analyzing fifteen gender equality indicators for ninety-five countries and
exploring economic potentials resulting from a closed global gender gap); See generally
CREDIT SUISSE, GENDER DIVERSITY & CORPORATE PERFORMANCE (2012) [hereinafter GENDER
DIVERSITY]; CREDIT SUISSE, THE CS GENDER 3000: WOMEN IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT (2014)
[hereinafter WOMEN IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT]; Andrew Pettigrew, On Studying Managerial
Elites, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163, 170 (1992); CATALYST INFORMATION CENTER, WHY
DIVERSITY MATTERS (2013), http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/why_diversity_matters_cat
alyst_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RSX-B6YN] [hereinafter CATALYST INFORMATION CENTER];
VIVIAN HUNT ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, DIVERSITY MATTERS (McKinsey &
Company
2014),
https://web.duke.edu/equity/toolkit/documents/DiversityMatters.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3982-7TNA] [hereinafter DIVERSITY MATTERS]; MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTI
TUTE, WOMEN MATTER (MCKINSEY & COMPANY 2007), http://www.raeng.org.uk/publica
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consultants go furthest in their predictions of a “diversity dividend,” a term
that presumes a regular payout from inclusion. 3 In 2015, the McKinsey
Global Institute asserted that “advancing women’s equality can add $12
trillion to global growth.” 4 As fabulously optimistic as these projections
seem, they nonetheless inspire firms to expand diversity and inclusion
initiatives. Armed with such studies, firms may reason that they can do well
by doing good.5

A flashpoint of diversity is the struggle to include women in
corporate leadership, which has led many developed economies to
mandate board quotas.6 While quotas prove anathema in the United
tions/other/women-matter-oct-2007 [https://perma.cc/K7HC-8GBP] [hereinafter WOMEN
MATTER] (providing a fact-based analysis of the importance of female leadership in business
setting and examining how having more female leaders in business will lead to economic
growth).
3. See generally Daan Van Knippenberg & S. Alexander Haslam, Realizing the
Diversity Dividend: Exploring the Subtle Interplay Between Identity, Ideology, and Reality,
in SOCIAL IDENTITY AT WORK: DEVELOPING THEORY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICE 61
(2003) (“Diversity dividend is the positive monetary outcomes “associated with harnessing
and leveraging the social identities and resources of diverse individuals and workgroups.”);
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANIZATIONS 109 (Regine Bend et al. eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2015). For more quotidian uses, see JULIA BOURKE & VISHALLI DONGRIE,
DELOITTE, A GLOBAL DIVERSITY DIVIDEND (2013), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/D
eloitte/global/Documents/HumanCapital/dttl-humancapital-trends4-diversity-no-exp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8SDX-8CPH].
4. See POWER OF PARITY, supra note 2 (Drawing on countries with high metrics of
inclusion and estimating how much growth might result if each region matched its highest
performer). One wonders whether firm leaders accept such fabulously optimistic projections
at face value.
5. The McKinsey Global Institute asserts that more diverse companies and institutions
perform better. DIVERSITY MATTERS, supra note 2, at 1; POWER OF PARITY, supra note 2, at
95. One survey affirms that “greater diversity in boards and management are empirically
associated with higher returns on equity, higher price/book valuations and superior stock price
performance.” WOMEN IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 3. When discussing the
initiatives that businesses can adopt to reduce gender inequality, in a separate survey the
McKinsey Global Institute claimed that the
“potential benefits to GDP growth [due to increasing diversity] that we have
identified can have a positive impact on all companies. In addition, companies
that embrace gender diversity and develop effective business models that target
women as consumers, distributors, or suppliers can gain greater competitive
advantage and growth in profits.” Other studies show that “companies with a
higher proportion of women on their management committees are also the
companies that have the best performance.”
WOMEN MATTER, supra note 2, at 14.
6. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: Gender
Diversity on Boards: The Future Is Almost Here, N.Y. L. J. (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202752912972/gender-diversity-on-
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States, recent events may have turned the tide. The Weinstein
Company had to pass through bankruptcy to find a buyer. Ford fired
its CEO for “inappropriate behavior.”7 Stock in Wynn Resorts dived
after its founder and CEO stepped down in disgrace.8 These scandals
exposed not only the prevalence of sexual harassment, but the
widespread exclusion of women from corporate governance. Boards
with only men (the Weinstein Company), almost all men (Wynn
Resorts), or mostly men (Ford) suffer from some groupthink, which
has been brought to light by the #metoo moment.9
The corporate world had earlier warnings. In 2013, a swirl of
controversy greeted Twitter’s IPO because its proposed board of directors
included no women. Twitter rushed to include a woman on the board.10 On
occasion, firms may bring in “outsider” women to clean the mess of errant
male leaders, a role Arianna Huffington played on Uber’s board.11 Indeed,
boards-the-future-is-almost-here/ [https://perma.cc/Q3J3-WX6X].
7. Joann Muller, Ford North America President Raj Nair Fired for ‘Inappropriate
Behavior’, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller
/2018/02/21/ford-north-america-president-raj-nair-fired-for-inappropriatebehavior/#2fdd48704d7d [https://perma.cc/3NVB-349L].
8. Jethro Mullen, Steve Wynn Steps Down as CEO of Wynn Resorts After Misconduct
Allegations, CNN MONEY (Feb. 7, 2018, 2:51 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/06/news
/companies/steve-wynn-stepping-down-ceo-wynn-resorts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/WEZ2-BNR2].
9. See generally Melissa Gira Grant, “The Unsexy Truth About Harrassment,” NY
REVIEW OF BOOKS (Dec. 8, 2017), www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/12/08/the-unsexy-truthabout-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/BNS4-TJL6].
10. Board of Directors, TWITTER, https://investor.twitterinc.com/directors.cfm [https: //
perma.cc/5FYL-27HA] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); Hayley Tsukayama, Twitter Appoints
First Woman, Marjorie Scardino, to Board of Directors, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/twitter-appoints-first-womanmarjorie-scardino-to-board-of-directors/2013/12/05/531f8534-5dc3-11e3-bc56c6ca94801fac_story.html?utm_term=.b5ab21e9eef4 [https://perma.cc/V49U-B62G]. More
recently, even wider opprobrium greeted a Google engineer’s memo which blamed women’s
biology for their low numbers in tech engineering. The wave of condemnation led to the
firing of James Damore, who then penned his own story. See James Damore, Why I Was
Fired by Google, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2017, at C2 (providing his perspective on his
discharge from Google). The memo’s author, had he been correct, would have absolved
Google and other tech companies for the paucity of women in their ranks. The condemnation
resembled that against Lawrence Summers, then President of Harvard, who made a highly
controversial speech about women in science, which led to his resignation. Suzanne
Goldenberg, Why women are poor at science, by Harvard president, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18,
2005), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2005/jan/18/educationsgendergap.genderissues
[https://perma.cc/8SY5-P8E3]; Alan Finder et al., President of Harvard Resigns, Ending
Stormy 5-year Tenure, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/ed
ucation/22harvard.html [https://perma.cc/V4BH-3MSX].
11. Katie Benner & Mike Isaac, As Uber Leaders Step Aside, Arianna Huffington’s
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McKinsey’s grandiose assertion of the growth that awaits a world of gender
equality relies on savior stories like Ms. Huffington’s. Most women,
however, find themselves left outside corporate leadership, or included as a
small minority. Firms may place them in onerous circumstances hoping
these outsiders will become savior. 12 Methodologically, we can be skeptical
about diversity dividend arguments. 13 What benefits, precisely, will
women’s inclusion bring?
The obvious answers touted in diversity consultancy traffic in too many
stereotypes to count. Even stronger studies face challenges. Scholars,
including myself, have looked at the implementation of quotas for women as
a useful natural experiment. Methodological challenges remain: timing
issues, control groups, sample selection and other problems undermine the
utility of the data. 14 Between the limited actual power of boards and
widespread misunderstanding about sex differences, skepticism is the proper
posture toward data on diversity’s value.
Much of the research involving women on boards fails to report any
negative or neutral outcome. Part of the reason for this may be the replication
crisis which has revealed that many studies cannot be repeated and that there
is a strong bias toward positive results.15 Social scientists face a replicability
Influence Grows, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/busi
ness/uber-arianna-huffington-board.html [https://perma.cc/PQ48-5QYS].
12. Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White?: Rethinking Race in Post-Racial
America, Oxford Press Ed. (2013).
13. Daniel Ferreira, Board Diversity: Should We Trust Research to Inform Policy?, 23
CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 108, 108-111 (Mar. 2015).
14. The first issue that Ferreira raises regarding those studies is the timing problem. He
mentions the several possible starting dates that such a study could use: in 1999 the gender
quota was first discussed, in 2003 a law suggesting a 40% quota was passed (with no penalty
for non-compliance), in 2005 liquidation was added as a penalty for non-compliance, and full
compliance was not achieved until 2008. The second issue the author identifies is choosing
a control group. Other firms that aren’t forced into gender diversity in Norway have different
corporate structures; companies in other Nordic countries operate under different legal
environments, use different currencies, and exist in different macro-economic conditions.
The third issue is sample selection. The author contends that defining control and treatment
groups is useless because firms self-select into both groups. The fourth issue is the multitude
of confounding effects. Other governance-related reforms are occurring contemporaneously
with the introduction of gender quotas. How can it be determined that such other governancerelated reforms (i.e., Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance in 2005) are not
actually responsible for performance changes? The final issue is the mechanism. There are
significant differences in the mechanism that researchers claim lead to changes in firm
performance based on gender diversity. For example, some argue that the change is due to the
age and experience of the incoming female directors (often younger and less experienced),
while others attribute the change to the female leadership style. Id.
15. Ed Yong, “Psychology’s Replication Crisis Can’t Be Wished Away,” ATLANTIC (Ma
r. 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/03/psychologys-replication-
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and tend to refrain from reporting data that reports neutral outcomes.16 With
data on women on corporate boards, the normative support for inclusion may
affect the bias on results away from negative findings. A notable exception
is one study that argues that stock prices in Norway dipped after full
implementation of the corporate board quota in part because of the newly
inexperienced boards serving those firms. 17 How then can we determine
when board diversity will benefit firms?
This Article presents a friendly but critical challenge to the argument
that diversity pays. One can favor diversity but recognize that some firms
may not accrue diversity dividends. Women, though providing identity
diversity to a male-dominated board, may bring little experiential diversity.18
As I argue here, diversity benefits depend on each specific context: the type
of women that firms include, the types of firms participating in inclusion,
and the jurisdictions in which the firms are diversifying. While normative
rationales, such as equality of opportunity and/or outcome, or redistribution,
prompt support of diversity, this Article contests the less controversial and
apparently universal belief that including women yields an instrumental
value.19
crisis-cant-be-wished-away/472272/ [https://perma.cc/QPL4-33MW] (“There’s publication
bias—the tendency to only publish studies with positive results, while dismissing those with
negative ones”).
16. Wojciech Swiatkowski & Benoit Dompnier, Replicability Crisis in Social Psycholo
gy: Looking at the Past to Find New Pathways for the Future, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2017), https://www.rips-irsp.com/articles/10.5334/irsp.66/ [https://per
ma.cc/FU5K-HE34] (“Furthermore, it should also be noted that many scientific practices that
easily result in false-positive findings have often been encouraged by unrealistic standards of
perfection for publication. Indeed, authors are too often demanded to present an almost
perfect match between the theoretical predictions they test and the empirical evidence they
find in their studies.” (citations omitted)); Jeffery R. Stevens, Replicability and
Reproducibility in Comparative Psychology, 8 Front Psychol. 62 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nl
m.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5445189/ [https://perma.cc/UF2P-UXFT] (“At many steps in
the scientific process, researchers can fall prey to confirmation bias by focusing on positive
confirmations of hypotheses. At the experimental design stage, researchers may develop tests
that attempt to confirm rather than disconfirm hypotheses. This typically relies on null
hypothesis significance testing, which is frequently misunderstood and misapplied by
researchers and focuses on a null hypothesis rather than alternative hypotheses.” (citations
omitted)).
17. See Kenneth Ahern & Amy Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on
Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q. J. ECON. 137 (2012).
18. Women who join a board may or may not share the stereotypically female cognitive
repertoire. Kathrine W. Phillips, What is the Real Value of Diversity in Organizations?
Questioning Our Assumptions, in THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF IN THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 229-233 (Earl Lewis & Nancy Cantor eds., 2017).
19. I support inclusion for equality reasons, not instrumental ones, even if my support is
inchoate. While I oppose these constraints, this Article focuses on diversity’s instrumentality
instead of thorny normative debates.
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More specifically, this Article presents a theoretical architecture for
systematizing diversity’s value.20 The degree of a diversity dividend depends
on three contextual factors: the who (which women bring beneficial values?),
the what (what types of firms?), and the where (in what nation?). The chart
below integrates these contextual factors that mediate the interaction
between diversification and the instrumental benefit.
Figure 1: Map of Contextual Factors21

As if ordering from a take-out restaurant menu, one might select a

20. Rather than referencing a diversity dividend, which may imply something
specifically monetary, I prefer referencing instrumental benefits, which include a broader field
of positive outcomes for firms. One challenge in this exercise is how to ask the right questions
about diversity. In that regard, Scott Page provides a persuasive aggregation of social science
data on difference that has proven useful to my analyses. See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE
DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND
SOCIETIES (Princeton Univ. Press 2008) (examining the power of collective wisdom and
suggesting that diversity, rather than individuality, contributes to superior outcomes).
21. This chart was drafted based on several sources. The left column represents several
of the theories of value posited by legal and social science scholars on what benefits women
bring. See infra Figure 2 in Part II. The second column sets forth a nonexclusive set of factors
that affect diversity implementation.
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variable from Factor One22 and a combination of variables from Factor Two23
and Factor Three. 24 The resulting diversity benefit will vary with each
combination. From left to right (although not necessarily in a linear fashion),
the chart links particular traits to potential instrumental benefits.
This Article analyzes these issues in five parts. Part I explores the
diversity’s vagueness in the muddied normative and instrumentalist
arguments. The following three parts detail the diversity factors: identity,
firm, and national variation. Part II dissects the identity category of
“women,” through queer theory, to ascertain diversity’s actual effects, which
draw more on diverse experience than on diverse identity. 25 Part III
22. Factor One lists some of the various traits ascribed to women by studies and
advocates with regard to corporate governance. Some of these categories derive from my
own study of French corporate boards, while others surface from other social science. The
presence of these categories on this chart does not confer any currency on these traits, but if
one ascribes some purchase to them, we must assess whether it might actually produce the
desired corporate purpose. For example, if one hopes or believes that women are “risk
averse,” one must push said trait through the other factors (the firm and the jurisdiction) to
get to a potential instrumental benefit. Risk aversion, to stay with the same example, might
prove valuable in an industry such as banking, but could be quite the opposite in technology
or pharmaceuticals.
23. Factor Two includes several notable firm traits that may prove relevant to assessing
whether some value may result. Firm type, ownership, age, and governance are but four traits
– one could easily add more sub-columns to this factor, such as capitalization, globalization,
and others. These four provide an idea of how nuanced these analyses must be to prove
effective at achieving some instrumental benefit.
24. Factor Three includes distinct types of governmental systems. If space permitted, a
fuller analysis could include other aspects of the public context in which the firm operates,
such the jurisdiction’s legal system, as well as developmental elements. The third draws on
basic variation of investment contexts many of which are describe in Mark Roe’s work. See
MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT,
CORPORATE IMPACT (2003).
25. See PAGE, supra note 20, at 305. This Article builds on a recent article, written by
me along with Daria Roithmayr. See Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a
Woman: Insights into Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV.
889 (2015). This preliminary assessment qualitative study sought to ascertain from board
members if and how the French corporate board quota, which requires 40% representation,
might alter corporate governance, with a focus on the potential effect on process and substance
in board decisions. Two findings surfaced from board members, assuming they represented
their boards accurately: first, process may improve but it would not alter the substantive
decisions of boards; second, if the quota has had a substantive impact on corporate
governance, it is not because new members were women, but because of their newness and
outsider status. Firms opportunistically improved their governance through the diversification
of perspectives. That article (tentative) conclusion proved surprising: women did not make
a substantive difference, only a process one, and the effects of their newness proved more
relevant than their sex. Some of the improved process may relate to the newness of
participants concerned with impressing new colleagues. Although sex composition of boards
has changed, and in some instances decision-making processes varied, board member
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addresses variation among firms in market profiles, ownership, and
governance structure that affect when diversity creates value. Firms with
stronger board cultures will benefit most from greater diversity. Part IV
considers where firms operate.26 Regulations differ across national lines as
to when and how diversity may be implemented. Critical masses of diversity
– whether achieved by regulation or social change – will produce the greatest
benefit. Part V uses hypothetical examples to illustrate how the factors
interact. The Article concludes by charting subsequent empirical and
theoretical work that would test this theory about when, where, and how
diversity will likely produce benefits.
I.

DIVERSITY: A CAUTIONARY NOTE

U.S. law favors vague definitions of diversity because of its
heterogeneity. As a consequence, diversity efforts in the United States
have been ambiguous. This approach engenders slippage between
normative and instrumental rationales.27 Should boards diversify to
rectify inequality or rather, to serve corporate needs? A critique on
these motivations helps understand why research on diversity’s
benefits proves challenging.
A. Diversity’s Omnipresent Haze

Diversity involves the inclusion of differences in a group or
organization. 28 While leading institutions in government, business,
and nonprofits attempt to further diversity, especially in the U.S., they
lack a precise plan of how and with whom to diversify.29 Most large
participants do not believe board decisions have differed substantively because of sex. Id. at
910. The conclusions from that project serve to launch the much broader points made in this
article.
26. For example, U.S. affirmative action laws and norms permit some accounting for
racial and ethnic diversity, while France’s constitutional structures further limit such
considerations. Firm variation appears still more mutable in light of these vertical factors.
27. See Lawrence M. Solan, et al., Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 901
(2011) (“We believe, however, that the lack of strong empirical support for board diversity
with respect to shareholder value or board performance does not necessarily doom the cau
se of diversity advocates. We argue that diversity advocates should endorse justifications and
normative frameworks other than shareholder value to support diverse boards”).
28. PAGE, supra note 20, at xxiv, 5.
29. Michele E. A. Jayne & Robert L. Dipboye, Leveraging Diversity to Improve Business
Performance: Research Findings and Recommendations for Organizations, 43 HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. J. 409 (2004).
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U.S. firms have a diversity infrastructure of employee identity groups,
human resource professionals, and outside consultants.30 This effort
plays a central role in recruiting. Multinational firms export United
States notions of identity, including diversity, within their human
resource efforts abroad. This market-driven push fosters a widespread
belief in the value of diversity, despite divergent philosophies driving
global competition.31
Ambiguity characterizes this staunch pursuit, as firms define
diversity in many ways, or not at all. 32 Most include identity
categories such as race or sex, while few, if any, reference less-defined
categories, such as social position or class. 33 The Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) rule on diversity in firm governance
exemplifies the distinctions of diversity measures within the United
States. The SEC’s Rule 407(c) of Regulation S-K declines to define
diversity but requires firms that have diversity quotas or initiatives to
disclose how the policy is implemented.34 A recent study of U.S. board
members revealed that while all agreed to diversity’s paramount
status, but few specifics, suggested as to diversity’s lack of real
meaning or impact.35
Vague definitions of diversity allow firms to select the one that
suits their needs. First, the more facile focus on identity substitute for
30. Id. at 412. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin et al., Diversity Management in Corporate
America, 6 CONTEXTS 21, 21-28 (2007) (describing different approaches for diversifying).
31. Dobbin et al., supra note 30; R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., From Affirmative Action to
Affirming Diversity, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 2, 107 (Mar.-Apr. 1990).
32. AARON DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW,
GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 190-191 (2015).
33. Id. I use “sex” rather than “gender” because the quota’s key determination of who
belongs on boards mandates a binarist distinction between men and women, rather than a
more fluid framework.
34. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c) (2014); SEC Adopts Final Rules on Enhanced Proxy
Statement Disclosures About Risk, Compensation and Other Corporate Governance Matters,
GIBSON DUNN (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/SECAdopts
FinalRulesEnhancedProxyStatementDisclosures.aspx [https://perma.cc/6QE8-BT2F] (“The
rules as adopted require disclosure of whether, and if so how, a nominating committee
considers diversity in identifying nominees for directors. Moreover, in what may be a
regulatory first for disclosure of the inner workings of a board, if a nominating committee has
a policy with regard to consideration of diversity, the rules require disclosure of how the
policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating committee assesses the effectiveness
of the policy.”).
35. John M. Conley et al., Narratives of Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom: What
Corporate Insiders Say About Why Diversity Matters, in DISCOURSE PERSPECTIVES ON
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION (Farleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 2012).
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experience diversity, even though research shows that the latter is
more important than the former.36 Firms may, for example, include
black employees by hiring West Indian elites rather than African
Americans.37 Similarly, some firms bring in foreign diversity to mask
a lack of diversity among employees from the United States. Second,
this vague diversity permits its use for other broader diversity, such as
sexual orientation. 38 The SEC rule mentioned above favors this
breadth, as it permits firms to self-define. Third, firms use diversity
rhetoric to avoid discrimination litigation, or alternatively, to obscure
diversity efforts to maintain a non-diverse status quo.
B. Instrumentalism v. Normativity

Several normative arguments support sex diversity in
leadership: to provide a symbol for newer generations, to reflect the
need for public values in private institutions, or to rectify structural
exclusion through equality of opportunity, or outcome.39 Normative
36. See infra Part II.
37. As Lani Guinier and others have studied, affirmative action programs for race often
end up benefitting Caribbean blacks over African Americans, in part because of underlying
class issues and culture within the larger rubric of Black identity. See LANI GUINIER, THE
TYRANNY OF THE MERITOCRACY: DEMOCRATIZING HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (Beacon
Press 2015). See also Belinda Edmondson, The Myth of Black Immigrant Privilege,4
ANTHURIUM: A CARIBBEAN STUDIES J. 1 (2006) (analyzing and comparing African American
immigrants with African American natives); Douglas S. Massey et al., Black Immigrants and
Black Natives Attending Selective Colleges and Universities in the United States, 113 AM. J.
EDUC. 243, 249 (2006) (discussing that top universities tend to matriculate more African
American immigrants than African American natives); Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top
Colleges Take More Blacks, but Which Ones?, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2004) (emphasizing that
a vast majority of the African American population at Harvard consisted of West Indian or
African American immigrants).
38. “Out Leadership” is a group that advocates for the inclusion of LGBT people in
corporate leadership. “About,” OUT LEADERSHIP, http://outleadership.com/about/ [https://per
ma.cc/43HX-MLVJ] (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
39. I have my own normative argument as to why we should pursue corporate,
including board, diversity, but it is, as yet, inchoate. While I have supported equality remedies
before I am not sure to what extent they provide an overall normative framework. One
argument I previously advanced was that quotas instantiate public values in firms, who owe
their existence to the state’s recognition of their limited liability status. See Darren
Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55 (2010)
[hereinafter Feminizing Capital]. Through quotas, women attain descriptive representation
in leadership which serves a symbolic role. Veronique Magnier & Darren Rosenblum, Quotas
and the Transatlantic Divergence of Corporate Governance, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 249
(2014). Quotas function to foster balance in the private sector which may further gender
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proponents may couch their support within instrumentalism to gain
more traction as normative assertions arouse little widespread
agreement. Yet, these business case arguments may conflict with the
normative reasons for diversity.40 Instrumentalism evades contested
debates like affirmative action to focus on profitability, which proves
entirely uncontroversial. Thanks to this slippage, instrumentalist
arguments dominate, bolstered by sincere instrumentalists and
normativists who seek a means to their end goal of diversity.41 Strong
political incentives exist to advance instrumentalism.42

equity in family structures. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward A New Culture of
Parenting, 35 Harv. J. L. & Gender 57 (2012); Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance:
Reframing Identity-Based Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2891 (2008)
[hereinafter Loving Gender Balance]. A broader compelling case is made by Professors
Lawrence M. Solan, James Fanto, and John M. Darly, in their article, Justifying Board
Diversity. They note that the board’s link to shareholder value is too attenuated to support a
diversity argument for instrumental reasons. They further argue that diversity advocates
should be content in winning the “diversity battle,” despite not winning the “empirical
battles.” They assert, however, that other reasons exist in support of board diversity, such as
improvements in firm functioning and countering group pathologies on boards. See Lawrence
M. Solan, et al., Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901, 919 (2011). Patrick S. Shin
& Mitu Gulati, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance: Filling in the Gaps: Showcasing
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1024-44 (2011).
40. I view instrumental arguments and normative arguments as separate tracks that may
lead to similar outcomes. This Article underlines the serious methodological challenges in
gathering accurate data about women on corporate boards. That challenge, to my mind, does
not undermine the normative case for diversity. However, some argue that using instrumental
arguments over core moral questions, such as torture, is the wrong approach. Jeremy Waldron,
Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681,
1714, 1715 (2005) (arguing that human rights law mandates that torture should not even be
considered as an option for authorities, even in the case of attempting to find a nuclear bomb).
This Article engages with the instrumental debates because they hold so much purchase within
the corporate world, whose purpose after all is the instrumental goal of profitability.
However, I recognize that it is possible that the dominance of these instrumental arguments
may divert attention from normative arguments and override fundamental normative
commitments. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 413 (1999). On diversity’s normative and instrumental arguments, see also Lisa M.
Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 855
(2011)
41. For example, according to a study by Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, firms run by
female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than
otherwise similar firms run by male CEOs. Mara Faccio et al., CEO, Gender, Corporate RiskTaking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation (University of Manchester Library, Working
Paper, 2015).
42. An analogous phenomenon of hidden normative agendas may occur with notunrelated corporate governance issues, such as sustainability or philanthropy.
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Equality norms ground affirmative action; however, since
firms are required to prioritize shareholder profits, such efforts may
arouse shareholder skepticism. The famous Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.
case and the more recent eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark
case both grapple with this question. 43 In Dodge, plaintiff
shareholders challenged, among other claims, Ford’s stated goal of
improving workers’ lives. The court rejected Ford’s objective,
upholding the shareholders’ arguments that it did not serve the
corporate purpose.44 Likewise, in eBay, the court asserted that because
eBay chose to operate as a for-profit firm, the company must primarily
operate for the goal of profit-making, not that of aiding other
communities.
The instrumental studies referenced above promise stronger
growth and better governance.45 They reflect the following goals: (a)
to attract more and higher quality talent; (b) to increase the firm’s
market; (c) to avoid employment discrimination litigation; (d) to
improve employee relations; and (e) to strengthen corporate
governance.46 Some persuasively question the methodological basis
for instrumentalist studies47 and studies may contradict each other in

43. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 679 (Mich. 1919).
44. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685. The Dodge decision continues to influence American
corporate law to this day. Its impact is best exemplified in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, where the Chancellor held that two craigslist directors – and majority shareholders
– breached their duties to a minority shareholder, eBay, by putting their public-spirited
interests above stockholder wealth maximization. The court further explained that
“[a]s an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate about an organization
seeking to aid local, national, and global communities by providing a website for
online classifieds that is largely devoid of monetized elements. The corporate
form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for
purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders
interested in realizing a return on their investment. Having chosen a for-profit
corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and
standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote
the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”
eBay, 16 A.3d at 34.
45. CATALYST INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 2; DIVERSITY MATTERS, supra note 2;
POWER OF PARITY, supra note 2; WOMEN MATTER, supra note 2.
46. See Fairfax, supra note 40 at 858-59 (attempting to understand diversity stagnation
on boards).
47. Ferreira, supra note 13.
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their findings. 48 Despite these concerns, instrumentalist arguments
continue to gain traction.49
Diversity’s widespread acceptance benefits from slippage
between instrumentalist and normative arguments.50 Instrumentalism
can serve to hide normativity both for and against diversity.
Normative opponents of diversity may accept instrumentalist diversity
arguments to avoid uncomfortable debates. Instrumentalism seems
nondiscriminatory and allows adherents to say they favor diversity
even as they skirt conversations about its value in and of itself. They
may deploy the language of “fit” to avoid inclusion,51 claim that no
“skilled” diverse people were in the pool, or rely on diversity of
identity to bypass diversity of experience, as in the Caribbean/AfricanAmerican example above.
This slippage reflects some core theoretical disagreements over
what should fuel diversity efforts. Gary Becker argued that
discrimination is inefficient, and that over time an efficient market
would right itself by eliminating discrimination.52 Critics note that the
theory’s popularity weakened the push for policy remedies and that
discrimination’s persistence itself undermines the purchase of
Becker’s claim.53 Related, arguments for colorblind remedies abound,
rejecting the notion that attention to identity can correct inequality.
48. Id. Daniel Ferreira argues that while many studies convey that women are risk
averse, there are also studies that suggest the opposite. He cites a study of Swedish directors
conducted by Adams and Funk in 2012 which found that female directors were more riskloving than their male counterparts. See R. B. Adams & P. C. Funk, Beyond the Glass Ceiling:
Does Gender Matter?, 58 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 219 (2012).
49. Fairfax, supra note 40.
50. Shin & Gulati, supra note 39, at 1020.
51. “Fit” also plays a key role in the elite corporate context to ensure that new people
conform to the expectations of the firm’s established elite. See, e.g., Lauren A. Rivera, Hiring
as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional Service Firms, 77(6) AM. SOC. REV.
999 (2012). Firms often deploy the language of “fit” to describe whether an individual will
succeed in a particular position. This subjective category reinforces extant social advantages
for particular groups, and it subtly weeds out difference. The value of diversity may go
beyond “fit” and its reduction of elite personnel to atomistic distinctions. See generally PAGE,
supra note 20. Although all diverse individuals (in this case, women) will not perform
similarly in all firms, the converse is not true either. The role of personality suggests that
people are people; differences surface at the individual level. Other factors suggest that
systematization remains possible, even if the contextual factors complicate such analyses.
52. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
53 . See Kevin M. Murphy, How Gary Becker Saw the Scourge of Discrimination,
CHICAGO BOOTH REVIEW (June 15, 2015) http://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/winter2014/how-gary-becker-saw-the-scourge-of-discrimination [https://perma.cc/3DJ9-CPQA]
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The big tent of instrumentalists, filled with both sincere
instrumentalists and normative proponents and opponents, seems to
inflate diversity’s value.54 The loose description of correlative data
makes it sound causal. Instrumentalism risks failing to deliver on
promised goals. If promised outcomes do not materialize, it would
undermine inclusion efforts. Into this instrumentalist morass, I hope to
insert some clarity of method.
II.

DIVERSITY OF PEOPLE

Firms cannot simply add women and expect an instrumental
benefit – sex alone cannot do the work.55 However, regulators and
(“. . . if people have a tendency to discriminate on the basis of race, legislation cannot
eliminate that tendency. Politicians cannot merely legislate a new outcome, or legislate
preferences away. They can only change the way discrimination manifests itself.”). Drucilla
Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of Nativism:
Economics Freedom and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 641 (1999).
For a different demonstration of the persistence of discrimination, see DARIA ROITHMAYR,
REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014)
(explaining racism’s persistence as flowing from a series of racist feedback loops through
which white people lock in their advantage).
54. Many scholars fit this description but I admit my own Feminizing Capital article also
merits this criticism with its only-slightly qualified support for quotas. See Feminizing
Capital, supra note 40. Since the qualitative work I performed in 2011 and 2012, I have
realized the extent to which context defines such remedies, as discussed infra in Part IV.
55. This reflects the current understanding of the nature of sex difference, which eschews
an “essential” aspect and recognizes the diversity among individuals that crosses the sexes.
Gender theorists, led by U.S. scholars such as Judith Butler, hold that notions of
“womanhood” depend exclusively on cultural constructs, hence the use of “gender” rather
than “sex,” reflects a constructed, rather than biological, phenomenon. Judith Butler and other
gender theorists think of gender as grounded in performativity rather than fundamental traits.
See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990)
(stating that anti-essentialist feminism holds that no essential notion of “womanhood” exists).
Anti-essentialists reject presumptions that women are hard-wired nurturers, ascribing such
behaviors to cultural constructs. Although one’s body cannot fully determine one’s politics,
some relation must be present. Gayatri Spivak’s idea of strategic essentialism, or Judith
Butler’s idea of “contingent epistemology” provide theoretical frameworks. See Id.; GAYATRI
SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS (1987). Alice Eagly’s work on
biosocial essentialism conveys some crucial elements about how various cultures ascribe roles
and traits to people based on sex, and how culture produces these presumptions based on
biosocial understandings of sex. Wendy Wood & Alice H. Eagly, Biosocial Construction of
Sex Differences and Similarities in Behavior, 46 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH.
55 (2012). Simply because an individual woman cannot be assumed to represent another
woman does not mean that if half of the legislators were women that this legislature would do
no better in voicing women’s interests than an entirely male legislature. On a related point,
Veronique Magnier and I performed a fuller analysis of descriptive representation and
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corporate leaders seem to prefer sex diversity over other kinds for two
reasons: the perceived clarity of sex diversity and the strength of the
instrumental arguments. 56 But the categorization of “women” (as
diverse based on sex alone) predicts less change than many think. For
most identities, no clear categories exist, and identities often blur.57
Individuals often do not reflect traits ascribed to their identity.
The weakness of “sex” as a binary becomes clear in the
following thought experiment: imagine a female board member,
subject to a corporate board quota, who wants to transition from
woman to man, but risks losing their board position because the quota
requires increasing numbers of women.58 Here, a discrepancy surfaces
between identity and experience. Does changing sex change one’s
perspective? The male board member would presumably no longer

corporate quotas in our piece. Magnier & Rosenblum, supra note 39. Although the
essentialism debate primarily arises with regard to gender, many have raised such questions
with regard to race. In particular, black feminists, such as bell hooks and Kimberlé Crenshaw,
have emphasized the white nature of such concepts, asserting that one cannot separate race
from gender. bell hooks, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 32-33 (1981);
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
56. DHIR, supra note 32, at 191.
57. The sex binary, which cabins us humans into “women” and “men,” and accordingly
restricts our choices. See Darren Rosenblum, “Trapped” in Sing-Sing: Transgendered
Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499 (2000) (examining
human rights issues stemming from the incarceration of transgender prisoners and proposing
solutions to alleviate inhumane treatment); Darren Rosenblum, For Starters, Unsex the Birth
Certificate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2015) (proposing eliminating a fixed notion of sex by unlabeling binary gender at birth), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/10/19/ischecking-the-sex-box-necessary/for-starters-unsex-the-birth-certificate
[https://perma.cc/SW32-TEXB]. Children are born and society presumes, mostly based on
their genitalia, that they have distinct “girl” or “boy” traits–interests and behaviors that
develop into professional and familial roles which constrain individual opportunities. With
regard to race and sex identity, this blurring occurred in popular U.S. debates over Rachel
Dolezal and Caitlyn Jenner. Dolezal was a white woman who portrayed herself as black,
possibly in an opportunistic way, to attain a position within black community organizing as
part of a local NAACP organization. Tamara W. Harris, Black Like Who? Rachel Dolezal’s
Harmful Masquerade, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1Grlr1H
[https://perma.cc/QN65-CD36]. Jenner, by contrast, had been a celebrity for decades, and
became a woman to reflect her inner female identity. Ravi Somaiya, Caitlyn Jenner, Formerly
Bruce, Introduces Herself in Vanity Fair, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jOxJ0S
[https://perma.cc/L8YF-JY29].
58. She might lose her position or refrain from transitioning to keep her position – a
quandary transgender men face in women’s colleges. Ruth Padawer, When Women Become
Men at Wellesley, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2ka0EJE [https://perma.cc/NH
5P-WFM5].
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meet the quota’s definition59 He would, however, fulfill the purpose
of sex diversity. This Part explores how sex identity operates in the
boardroom.
A. Women as Women

The focus on identity rather than experiential diversity is a key
shortcoming in many diversity efforts, including quotas. Sex diversity
will benefit firms when identity serves as a proxy for experience.60 As
Daria Roithmayr and I suggested in our study on the French Corporate
Board Quota, including women may bring other experiential diversity
to the table: different schools, social networks, countries of origin,
corporate expertise, etc. Women might make a difference in these
firms not because of their gender identity, but because of their
newness.61
Some research suggests that the inclusion of women in
corporate boards improves profit and corporate governance thanks to
“womanly” traits, such as concern for stakeholders (reflecting a
caretaking orientation), or an aversion to risk.62 Some social science
59. The sex change hypothetical exposes how the binary within quotas falsely represents
sex. The binary often drives women’s inclusion especially in the context of corporate board
quotas. In that context, regulators, like most people, assume only two sexes exist (cisgender
male or cisgender female), even though many more do – intersex people, people with
differentials in primary and secondary sex traits, and transgender people. It is worth noting
that for the period of the quota’s implementation fewer men had the opportunity to join a
board – a marked contrast to the prior period. Pre-quota, there was some upward mobility for
men within French firms from middle management to the board. Post-quota, many if not most
available board positions must be filled with a woman to meet the quota’s requirements.
60. PAGE, supra note 20.
61. Id. at 919.
62. The risk aversion trait in particular played a critical role in the adoption of corporate
board quotas since the 2008 financial crisis. This trait may have drawn on inferences of
women’s role in family life – that women are caretakers or are more empathic. CAROL
GILLIGAN, MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN’S THINKING TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION (1989). For example, when Iceland was faced with
a financial crisis, the government chose to create a law requiring corporate boards to include
at least forty percent women. Nathaniel Popper, After Crisis, Iceland Holds a Tight Grip on
its Banks, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 15, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2nezFCe [https://perma.cc/J
4UL-UZ49]. Women, often serving as primary caretakers, presumption of women as “risk
averse,” since caretakers tend to refrain from risky endeavors that might endanger their
caretaking function. Id. This risk aversion finds some confirmation in social science. For
example, one study shows that the differential in wages actually relates to differences in
caretaker roles. Catherine R. Albiston et al., Law, Norms, and the Motherhood/Caretaker
Penalty,
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/albiston_1205
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links these traits to sex – people with caretaking roles tend to avoid
riskier work.63 Other traits ascribed to women include higher levels
of deliberation, or posing more methodical questions.64 Society also
places women in ethical decision-making roles.65 Although women in
the aggregate may exhibit certain traits, we cannot presume any one
woman will behave as “women” do. 66 Experience and identity
diverge. Within the corporate board context, many women have
professional trajectories that parallel or match those of men, thereby
making their traits more akin to those of the men already on the
board.67

12.pdf [https://perma.cc/924K-987H] (stating that caretakers are more risk averse, and
therefore receive less compensation).
63 . People with caretaking roles may take on less risky jobs, which may explain pay
differentials, as compensation increases with risk. Tim Worstall, Here’s Your Gender Pay
Gap Fatal Occupational Injuries, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tim
worstall/2016/12/21/heres-your-gender-pay-gap-fatal-occupational-injuries/#25557cbc6c3e
[https://perma.cc/G9AY-W3XF]; but see Barbara S. Kilbourne, Paula England, George
Farkas, Kurt Beron & Dorothea Wier, Returns to Skill, Compensating Differentials, and
Gender Bias: Effects of Occupational Characteristics on the Wages of White Women and
Men, 100 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY, no. 3, Nov. 1994, at 689.
64. Interview with 4F, in Paris, France; Interview with 14F, in Paris, France. The author
interviewed twenty-four current and former corporate board members from CAC-40 firms. A
full transcript, a redacted transcript, and a translated redacted transcript are on file with the
author. Interviews are referred to by an identification number and M or F to indicate sex.
65. Law often frames women as keepers of virtue and, by extension, ethics. See, e.g.,
Cythia Godsoe, Marriage Equality and the ‘New’ Maternalism, 6 CAL. L. REV. 145 (Nov.
2015); Michael J. O’Fallon & Keneth D. Butterfield, A Review of the Empirical Ethical
Decision-Making Literature: 1996–2003, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 375 (Jul. 2005). Society
increasingly presumes women behave more ethically than men. See Naomi Mezey & Cornelia
“Nina” Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229 (2012) (asserting
that current culture intensively fosters the idea that mothers are the default parent, responsible
for managing the “second shift”); Modern Family (ABC Television Network 2009-2015)
(depicting Claire, the mother, as the responsible parent in the family). As a result, we see that
women on boards tend to find themselves on audit committees. Sheela Thiruvadi, Gender
Differences in Audit Committees (Jan. 1, 2008) (unpublished dissertation) (on file with
Florida International University). Women may even be brought on to serve as role models
for future corporate players.
66. Phillips, supra note 18.
67. Given that “[t]he advocacy of descriptive representation can emphasize the worst
features of essentialism,” it is hard to justify descriptive representation. Jane Mansbridge,
Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes”, 61 J.
POL. 628, 638 (1999). Nonetheless, without some identity marking the representative and the
people represented, quotas cannot exist. Corporate board quotas mandate that women get
descriptive representation on boards, even though women do not necessarily share common
experiences.

DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S CONSENT

2017]

WHEN DOES BOARD DIVERSITY BENEFIT FIRMS?

447

Including women for their traits poses bigger problems. If we
drop facile presumptions of sex, a fuller picture materializes. What
traits does the market ascribe to women? Will their inclusion fulfill
those elevated expectations? How do women perform as “women”?
Drawing on the social science described above, Figure 2 disaggregates
the traits ascribed to women. It analyzes stereotypical traits of women
(Column 1) and what benefits may result from these purported traits
(Column 2). In doing so, the chart attempts to pull apart how women’s
purported instrumental value works while also demonstrating the
specificity of women’s participation in particular firms – which will
be addressed in Part III.
Figure 2. The Benefits of Sex Identity68
Purported Women’s
Traits
1. Caretaker
2. Risk Averse
3. Methodical
4. Outsider/New
Network
5. Insider/‟Manning
Up”
6. Role
Model/Symbolic

Potential Related Instrumental Benefit
Better for Stakeholders
Fewer losses in uncertain markets
Better governance; newer players may
be more careful
Relevant but diverse experience yields
benefits in creative work
Adds sex diversity but no instrumental
benefits
Long term value of encouraging future
candidates – broadens pool

This chart includes feminized traits firms may attain by
including women. They may have better luck finding proxies other
than the overbroad category of “women.”

68. The traits and benefits in this chart were compiled from various of sources, as well
as from the author’s personal experiences. See, e.g., Seeung Jung et al., Gender Wage Gaps
and Risky vs. Secure Employment: An Experimental Analysis (IZA Discussion Paper No.
10132, 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp10132.pdf; Catherine R. Albiston et al., supra note 67;
Interview with 4F, supra note 70; Interview with 14F, supra note 70; Page, supra note 20;
Interview with 5M, in Paris, France; Interview with 23M, in Paris, France; Devon W. Carbado
& Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get
There, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1643 (2004); Darren Rosenblum, Manning Up (forthcoming
2018) (on file with author); HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
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Given the wide range of traits ascribed to women, this chart
reveals the extent to which women may not fulfill firm expectations,
which may undermine diversity in the long term. It is not altogether
clear that, as a group, elite women would even possess these prized
traits. Elite executive women – educated, successful, and networked
women – benefit most from the quota wave. 69 By the time these
women arrive at the corporate board level, however, they have
extensive executive experience, which inculcates in them (as in their
male colleagues) an instinctive market orientation that may transcend
or minimize sex differences.70 Women who rise to the top often must
perform some version of professional maleness – they must be “more
guys than the guys.”71 Women in the corporate elite confront a double
bind in which they perform professional maleness – manning up to get
ahead – as they femme up to conform to stereotypes of women.72
For example, in my interviews of corporate board members in
France, some felt women members adopted distinctively masculine
characteristics to fit into male environments. 73 One male board
member said, “the ladies who succeed frequently in the top jobs [are]
more guys than the guys. To say that they brought diversity is a vision,

69. Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for Change: The Norway Model of Boardroom
Quotas as a Tool for Progress in the United States and Canada, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
81A, 103A (2012). Lani Guinier’s research underlines a compelling element with regard to
women: that when exogenous forces benefit a particular category, the people within the group
benefitted will be those most able to take advantage. This helps us understand that elite
women likely have other advantaged categories favoring them. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note
37.
70. See Manning Up, supra note 68 (arguing that women who rise to board positions
may engage in some “manning up” to prove themselves to the men who dominate nominating
committees that select new board members).
71. Interview with 1M, in Paris, France.
72. After Norway’s path-breaking quota, I argued that including women would feminize
capital. Feminizing Capital, supra note 39. Here, I add a caveat: The women may not
feminize firms as much as is expected. A fuller exploration of the sex and gender angle will
appear in Rosenblum, Manning Up, supra note 68. Women mirror the men they aspire to
replace and dress and act in a feminine fashion, a corporate femininity that constitutes its own
form of drag. Some argue quotas mean that board candidates join boards without full
inculcation in the hyper-masculine norms of corporate organizations since they join the board
from outside the firm. While for some women this is true, the priority for board-nominating
committees (and executives who often drive the process) appears to be obtaining women
whose qualifications match those of the men already on the board. While few women have
exactly parallel executive experience, other signs mark the new women’s “fit” on the board.
See supra footnote 51.
73. Interview with 2F, in Paris, France.
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a view of the spirit. It is biologically [true] but it is true only
biologically.”74 In terms of their professional capabilities, the women
selected to join the board fit the same mold as the men already on the
board. In decision-making, individual skills matter more than sex.
Overall, the interviewees suggested that other differences (national,
professional, etc.) mattered more than sex.75
If firms want stakeholder-oriented thinkers, their search might
prove more successful if they look for someone with caretaking
experience, such as a primary parent, instead of searching for a socalled average woman. Their experience may not match that of other
women, who on average tend to engage in higher levels of caretaking.
Blanket assumptions about women may fail to perform as
instrumentalists expect. Many women share certain traits, but if a firm
wants to improve its governance by including a caretaker (who may
be more stakeholder oriented) or someone more risk averse, it can only
use the category of “woman” as an initial proxy. The firm must go
further in its inquiries and, as the next subpart details, should look to
a woman’s experience.
B. Identity Matters, Somewhat

Social scientists have demonstrated that diversity of
experience and expertise matters most. Identity may convey
diversity’s presence even when the relevant experience remains
absent.76 Different experiences lead us to develop skills to respond to
distinct needs. Most board members have some executive experience
and the specific way of thinking about business problems. 77 One’s
professional experience at the time of joining a board has reached such
a substantial level that identity may matter less than more prominent

74. Interview with 1M, supra note 71.
75. Another board member commented that “[board members] have excellent personal
skills whether they are men or women. And if they ask good questions it’s because they are
good with breasts or without breasts. Here we are new members, but we do not feel we have
a women’s role to play more than an administrator role, or put in play by our own personality
and our own past experience. So me what I bring over other is industrial experience I gained
in . . ., but others bring more management experience or financial experience, so this is where
I stand out.” Interview with 7F, in Paris, France.
76. PAGE, supra note 20.
77. Devan Grossblatt, Boarded In: Counteracting the Consequences of Board Insularity
by Legitimizing Director Elections, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 553, 604 (2015).
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experiential factors. 78 Performance as a corporate board member
draws on life experiences: where one grew up, where one went to
school, and one’s family and community situations.79 Expertise also
matters, including one’s professional school, training, and networks.
Unlike identity, this all becomes a particular skill set over which one
may exercise control. 80 Despite this, firms often use identity as a
proxy for perspectives.81
While stereotyping can exclude women from typical models of
“effective” leadership, some studies suggest that female leaders do
express certain styles. Rather than adopting stereotypically male
leadership behavior (power, confidence, aggression, objectivity),
women may exhibit a more collaborative “transformational style,”
which takes greater account of others.82 Effective corporate decisionmaking requires board members to explore a wide range of questions,
and diverse board members focus on process in decision making.83 By
extension, women leaders may consider stakeholders more than men
might,84 and may consequently think in ways that are more “altruistic”
and “long-term.” 85 Women generally exhibit more risk aversion,
although that may or may not translate neatly to the boardroom. 86
78. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
79. Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much
Difference Does Difference Make, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 395 (2014).
80. DELOITTE, supra note 3.
81. Firms may use identity as a marker despite the widespread evidence that women may
reflect male perspectives. Take Margaret Thatcher, whose political performance reflected
none of the empathy traditionally affiliated with women. Indeed, she recognized that most
understood leadership as masculine and worked to deepen her voice in the lead-up to her
election as Prime Minister. Loving Gender Balance, supra note 39. Critical race scholars
have focused on this phenomenon. Examples surface in which intellectuals and researchers
presumed leaders of particular identities held a distinct political framework based on their
identity, but whose actual beliefs differed due to their experiences. During the confirmation
hearings of Clarence Thomas, several notable black intellectuals presented him as someone
who would express his blackness once on the court, even if his politics suggested otherwise.
Maya Angelou, To Be Sure, Thomas is Woeful, but There is Still Hope, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug.
28, 1991), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-08-28/news/1991240116_1_clarence-thom
as-highest-court-african-american [https://perma.cc/JAC2-NP86].
82. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in Corporate Leadership?
Evidence From Quotas, 5 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 136 (2013) [hereinafter A Female
Style in Corporate Leadership].
83. JULIET BOURKE, WHICH TWO HEADS ARE BETTER THAN ONE? (2016).
84. Id. at 33.
85. Id. at 5 (citing Irwin W. Silverman, Gender Differences in Delay of Gratification: A
Meta-Analysis, 49 SEX ROLES 451 (2003)).
86. A Female Style in Corporate Leadership, supra note 82 (citing James P. Byrnes et
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However, as Catalyst noted, more than forty studies spanning over
fifteen years have shown that there are very few differences between
how men and women exhibit leadership skills.87
Only recently has the corporate world discovered how
widespread it is for women to have faced sex discrimination or sexual
harassment. 88 Including people with experiences of subordination,
discrimination and harassment may alter processes or decisions.
While not all women can represent this experience or positions
building on it, identity may be a proxy for experience. The inclusion
of few if any women on boards of firms that have faced major sexual
harassment scandals is a suggestive if anecdotal data point, which
supports women’s inclusion qua women.
In contrast with such identity-oriented work, the focus on
experience rather than identity shows when difference matters. My
recent study with Daria Roithmayr supports the theory that
experiential diversity matters most. 89 Corporate board members
pointed to the different experiences women brought to the table – such
as distinct national exposure, distinct educational backgrounds, or
interests in environmental or labor issues.90 These experiences, not
sex, defined the quota’s effects. As one interviewee said, while
women may “not run a corporation in the same way as a man,” when
they were on the board, women “brought something [new,] less
because they were women [more] because of their different
background.” 91 Women who are outsiders affect and improve
corporate governance primarily through their wealth of diverse
experiences.92
al., Gender Differences in Risk Aversion: A Meta-Analysis, 125 PSYCH. BULLETIN 367-83
(1999)).
87. Catalyst, Women “Take Care,” Men “Take Charge:” Stereotyping of U.S. Business
Leaders Exposed, 12 (2005).
88. See, e.g., Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough is it to Change a Culture of
Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/in
teractive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/D3GR-D3C
N]; Harvey Weinstein: How the Scandal Unfolded, BBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.b
bc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672 [https://perma.cc/Y3QU-RFFB]; Sexual miscond
uct allegations against Steve Wynn hurt his empire, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21736201-mr-wynn-first-boss-big-publiccompany-face-accusations-metoo-era-sexual [https://perma.cc/935P-7SDE].
89. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 25.
90. Interview with 5M, supra note 68.
91. Interview with 22M, in Paris, France.
92. See generally PAGE, supra note 20. French boards appointed women members who
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In this view, women’s gender matters only indirectly. Rather,
it matters to the extent that they have different experiences, whether
that is imposed on them or chosen by them. “Identity differences lead
to experiential differences that in turn create tool differences,” or
different capacities. 93 Identity difference can create room for
cognitive difference to arise. 94 For example, we treat large men
differently than we treat small women, which leads them to have
different experiences and then react to the world in distinct ways. 95
However, inferences based on identity should not limit individuals’
capacity – any person can acquire any skill set regardless of identity.96
The leadership context shows how experience far outweighs identity.97
Identity difference not only facilitate cognitive difference, but
also carry a symbolic effect.98 Diverse leaders inspire future leaders
by demonstrating that leadership need not be homogenous. A leader
may thus play a descriptive role in representing a minority identity. 99
were more likely to be foreign, from non-elite professional and educational networks, less
experienced, and from specialties not traditionally represented on boards, like environment or
labor. See Interview with 5M, supra note 68; Interview with 23M, supra note 68. Some argue
that the gradual inclusion of minority individuals leads them to conform to established firm
norms. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 68. The relatively rapid inclusion of a critical mass of
women thanks to quotas may avoid this phenomenon, reducing demands to conform. The
force of a corporate board quota means women are not tokens, but play a key role in decisionmaking. Participants suggest these traits, which are associated with the women’s outsider and
newcomer status, not their sex, are potentially responsible for any difference in substantive
board decision-making after the quota. Some of the improved process may relate to the
newness of participants, concerned with impressing new colleagues. Although sex
composition of boards has changed, and in some instances decision-making processes varied,
board member participants do not believe board decisions have differed substantively because
of sex. Women’s distinct behavior with regard to process on the board supports Page’s
framing of diversity. They engage the material differently, but because their managerial
experience matches largely that of their male colleagues, their votes follow suit.
93. PAGE, supra note 20, at 307. Page continues by stating: “The effects of identity on
experience and opportunities are hard to measure. But almost no one disputes that they are
large. The relevant question for us is whether those differences translate into meaningful
cognitive differences – different perspectives, interpretations, heuristics, and predictive
models . . . People belonging to different identity groups pull from different wells of
experience.” Id.
94. Phillips, supra note 18.
95. Id.
96. “Men and women may differ in the tools they choose to acquire, yet this does not in
any way imply that they differ in the perspectives, heuristics, interpretations, and predictive
models that they could acquire.” PAGE, supra note 20.
97. Infra Part I-C-2.
98. PITKIN, supra note 68; Magnier & Rosenblum supra note 39.
99. Hanna Pitkin first explored this concept in The Concept of Representation, where
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Boards oversee management; therefore, a woman’s presence at the top
of the firm may provide an impression of representation and convey
opportunity to women lower in the hierarchy, which may improve
stakeholder power.100
C. Women’s Inclusion - Mixité and other Diversity

Any discussion of women’s inclusion must pose the question:
which women? Not all women share a cognitive or experiential
identity.101 Women cross every category of identity and experience,
and the perspectives they bring to work vary accordingly.
Intersectionality theory reflects these differences in how women are
treated distinctly across such variation in experience.102 It is diverse
experiences, and the cognitive understandings that arise from such
experiences, that lead to an increased instrumental benefit. Sex
diversity constitutes a subset of broader diversity, which would
include race, class, sexual orientation, and ability. Some other contexts
might require considering religion, national origin, language, and
education. These inclusion/exclusion categories vary across national
lines. For example, in France, sex diversity translates to mixité, a
legally recognized category in both political quotas and corporate

she distinguished “descriptive” from “interest” representation. PITKIN, supra note 68. Her
work focused on the context of political representation, in which she addressed how
“descriptive” representation involves “a descriptive likeness between representatives and
those for whom they stand.” Id. at 11. This is representation by identity. In this sense, “[a]
representative legislature, like a map or a mirror, is essentially an inanimate object, a
representation of the people in the sense that a painting is a representation of what it depicts.”
Id. Pitkin criticized descriptive representation as a static portrait of a society, in which a
group’s representation resides in someone with a like trait. Id.; see also Lani Guinier, The
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1102 (1991). By contrast, “interest” representation is about the
expression of ideas. Interest representation involves a common belief or idea that finds
representation in someone who agrees with that ideology, without regard to identity. PITKIN,
supra note 68.
100. As I have argued elsewhere, the presence of women on the boards of France’s (and
possibly Europe’s) largest companies will increase descriptive representation of women on
the board, and this will result in an increase in stakeholder governance as women (at least
descriptively) constitute stakeholders. PITKIN, supra note 68.
101. SCOTT PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF IN THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 229-233 (Earl Lewis & Nancy Cantor eds., 2017).
102. See Crenshaw, supra note 55, at 1242 (explaining how identity politics
problematically does not focus on differences within groups).
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board quotas. 103 Other kinds of diversité, such as counting and
considering race, are not legal. 104 In other European contexts,
corporate diversity focuses on sex as well, and only in the United
Kingdom (U.K.) are other categories of diversity widely considered.105
State recognition of diversity in one identity affects other identities;
recognition of sex as a protected category might undermine claims for
other diverse groups.106
Yet, diverse experience generally serves to improve
instrumental value and so, by extension, should broaden diversity.
Considering other kinds of diversity within the category of “women”
reveals how the identity/experience split surfaces with regard to these
other identities. 107 Firms may see leadership potential for a given
103. Mixité is a French term meaning sex diversity, but the “mixing” implies a mixing of
the two sexes. The use of this term reflects a central distinction drawn in the French context,
even as diversity remains central in the United States. While mixité refers to a clear binary of
male/female that is widely accepted in France, diversity carries a broader meaning in the
United States. “Mixité,” LAROUSSE FRENCH DICTIONARY, http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaire
s/francais/mixit%C3%A9/51851 [https://perma.cc/7X8F-VRB3] (last visited Feb. 23, 2018)
(follow link to “mixte”).
104. Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European
Union After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 331, 366 (2003).
105. The UK Corporate Governance Portal – Diversity and women on boards, NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/technical-resources/theuk-corporate-governance-portal/diversity-and-women-on-boards-/ [https://perma.cc/6BNPVS6G] (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
106. Julie Suk argues the corporate board quota in France reflects an effort to bolster the
democratic legitimacy of the French state by including women in key institutions in society –
corporate boards. Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to
Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449, 449 (2012). See Darren Rosenblum, Sex Quotas
and Burkini Bans, 92 TULANE L. REV. 469 (2017) (exploring the extent to which the
advancement of women’s rights in France comes at the disadvantage of other disenfranchised
groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities). The democratic legitimacy achieved by the
French corporate board quota renders it unnecessary to attain any further legitimacy by
including racial, ethnic, and religious groups. The sex binary plays a role here – its neatness
draws on the assumption that there are only two categories and that they convey natural and
meaningful differences. Race reflects more complex questions of economic inequality,
colonialism, and other politically fraught debates. From a European perspective, sex diversity
claims appear more cognizable. Id.
107. Before moving on to the identity/experience point, I also want to note the linkage
that exists within diversity between traits. Some diverse categories may benefit from the
misfortune of others. The actual complexity of the categories aside, “women” as a category
may benefit from a perception that the other large diversity category of “race” is too
complicated to engage. Within the French context in particular this is true – it is
unconstitutional for the state to even recognize any racial difference. See Martin Arnold,
Liberté, egalité et fraternité, but Only for Some, FIN. TIMES (London) (Nov. 7, 2005) at 2. It
may even be true in the U.S. if we consider the resistance to race-based affirmative action and
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woman rise or fall based on her other diverse identities. Intersectional
women who have diverse experiences not typical of corporate elites
may provide more value based on these diverse experiences than on
their sole identities as women.108 Occasionally, firms may view such
amalgamations of diverse experiences as a “twofer.” Indeed, when
French firms decided how to implement the corporate board quota for
women, many ended up “killing two birds with one stone” – adhering
to the quota, and choosing foreign women to further globalize the
firm.109
Whether this “twofer” analysis takes hold will depend on the
lens of social inclusions and exclusions. The inclusion of various
diverse perspectives, however, cannot be generalized as some firms
may view certain diverse experiences as more valuable than others.
One interviewee, in a side comment, mocked the quota saying, “Next,
we’ll have to hire a black lesbian.” 110 It may be that sex diversity
efforts overemphasize the benefits of including women compared to
other diverse perspectives. Excluded perspectives are ignored as they
may not accrue value for firms. As intersectionality theory
demonstrated decades ago, the exclusions people of multiple diverse
identities face overlap. 111 Implicit bias or a simple lack of
understanding of the value of diverse experiences might overwhelm
consideration of the potential value of diverse experiences.
In sum, the first factor – identity – reveals that whether diversity pays
off depends on the type of women brought on and what the firm
expects of them. Women will not, by virtue of their sex alone, bring
an instrumental benefit.112 Women board members must bring some
the reality that, as some scholars say, white women benefit most from affirmative action.
Sally Kohn, Affirmative Action Has Helped White Women More Than Anyone, TIME MAG.
(June 17, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/06/17/affirmative-action-has-helped-white-wom
en-more-than-anyone/ [https://perma.cc/L9W7-BZXV]. In some ways this makes sense –
white women share more in terms of class, education, and culture with men. Even within
black identity, certain subgroups benefit more. CONLEY ET AL., supra note 35. Action on sex
can prevent other diversity efforts; there is a presumption that the sex quota may lead to
broader inclusion of other kinds of diversity, as one interviewee asserted. Either way, sex
attains the focus as the legal and legitimate category of inclusion, and advocates assert this
category will do all the work that diversity more broadly writ needs to achieve. Id.
108. See infra, Part II.C.
109. See Interview with 1M, supra note 71.
110. Interview with 6M, in Paris, France.
111. See Crenshaw, supra note 55.
112. As Page argues, experiential diversity matters most. Page, supra note 20, at 305.
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experience that diverges from others at the firm. There are traits
ascribed to women, however, that might have clear consequences for
firm governance, such as risk aversion or stakeholder orientation.
Women may or may not embody the traits expected of them.
Further, women whose experience matches that of the men in their
firm will not bring a diversity benefit.113 Women who share the same
experience as men may contribute, in identity, to the critical mass of
thirty percent necessary for the effective participation of minorities
within group governance but undermine this effectiveness due to their
lack of diversity experience.114 As we will see in discussing Factor
Two, how their interventions will matter depends on the context in
which they operate: the firm.
III.

THE DIVERSITY OF FIRMS AND BOARDS

This part argues that the instrumental value of diversity varies
depending on the kind of firm and its governance structure. This part
will start by focusing on what boards do and how diversity might
matter in terms of their work. It will then describe the variation of firm
contexts for board work and assess when diversity will matter most.
It concludes that diversity will matter most where boards hold a more
influential role and where firms foster a critical mass of women.
A. Boards and Diversity

Boards play a central role in governance. They select the
executive and oversee the executive’s work. The way boards function
reveals when and how diversity matters. In most United States firms,
shareholders elect the board of directors, 115 who in turn hire the
Ferreira argues for a heavy dose of skepticism when considering the presumed benefits
women bring to governance. Ferreira, supra note 13, at 1.
113. See Page, supra note 20, at 305, 323, 364.
114. This figure follows Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s notion of critical mass as the arbiter for
when a minority’s voice would matter in a body dominated by a majority group. Rosabeth
Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses
to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 988 (1977). Kanter argued that only structural change
in organizations might achieve real shifts in the allocation of power, and these structural
changes would in turn change people as individuals, while changing the mere identity of
individuals would not alter the corporation overall. See also, KANTER, supra note 78.
115. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 155 (2008).
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executives. 116 The executives make crucial strategic decisions
regarding the corporation and run it on a day-to-day basis.117 Once the
executives take office, the board considers and approves decisions
made by the executives. 118 Board members then must ensure the
firm’s management complies with the law 119 and approve “the
strategic direction of the company and [oversee] the risks that the
company faces.”120 The board’s fiduciary duties require stakeholders
to impose high standards.121 This accountability exposes its members
to intense scrutiny for successes and failures. 122 Boards, most
importantly, hire CEOs to lead the firm and decide existential
questions related to mergers and acquisitions. 123 For that reason,
research on the effect women have on corporate governance should
focus on those two crucial elements.
Firm governance varies substantially. Small and mediumsized firms face distinct governance questions, and the value of
diversity within such firms necessarily depends on whether diversity
matters to key stakeholders. Governance structures vary substantially
outside the U.S. and affect how firms operate. National distinctions,
such as supervisory, tiered, and labor-inclusive boards completely
after board functioning. The board’s role legitimizes firms before their
principal constituents: equity markets, debt markets, and stakeholders.
The size of boards varies, as do rules implemented by both the state
and the firm regarding independence, representation, limitations on
board memberships, term length, and renewal. Even personalities
have their impacts within boards. For example, in some firms, the
board culture may be more assertive vis-à-vis the executive; while in
others, it may be more deferential.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 161.
Id. at 161-62.
Id. at 161.
BRUCE F. DRAVIS, THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 55 (1st ed. 2010).
120. Id. at 60.
121. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 52 (2008).
122. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997)
(explaining how activist institutional investors are holding directors accountable for their
actions on the board).
123. See Alexandra R. Laroux, “Role of the Board in M&A,” Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Sept. 7, 2015) https://corpgov.law. harv
ard.edu/2015/09/07/role-of-the-board-in-ma/ [https://perma.cc/UJF4-MX3L].

ROSENBLUM_TO PRINTER 9.17 (DO NOT DELETE)

458

9/17/2018 1:26 PM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.2

With this variation, some boards will benefit more from
diversity than others.124 Scott Page’s work suggests how.125 Repetitive
work doesn’t benefit from diversity, but problem solving or prediction
does.126 Distinct experiences make a diverse group capable of better
problem solving. 127 The best problem solvers tend to perform
similarly, so a collection of the best problem solvers may do little more
than one alone.128 In contrast, a diverse group shows more collective
strength.129 Page infers from this that diversity may matter more than
ability.130 Various management consultancies have confirmed Page’s
conclusions.131
Page’s work clarifies when the board’s engagement will reflect
diversity presence and when it will not. This requires assessing
whether the board’s work involves repetitive/implementation work or
creative effort. In analyzing the role boards play, Jill Fisch delineated
a range of board work that goes from monitoring work to managerial
work.132 A monitoring board oversees the firm, a role that SarbanesOxley and Dodd-Frank magnified. 133 A managerial board plays a
124. PAGE, supra note 20 (incorporating various sources and aggregating other social
science data on difference).
125. Id. at 325-26.
126. Id. at 314.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 324-25. To test whether diversity helps problem solving, Page focused on one
problem: “making the perfect cup of coffee,” with two elements, the ideal level of cream and
sugar for most people. Participants worked in groups “until no agent in the group could find
a better cup of coffee.” Id. at 135-36.
129. Id. at 324-25.
130. Id.
131. Ernst and Young conducted a study on diversity in the workforce that demonstrated
that more diverse groups performed better than homogeneous ones, even if the members of
the homogeneous groups were substantially more capable.
ERNST AND YOUNG,
GROUNDBREAKERS: USING THE STRENGTH OF WOMEN TO REBUILD THE WORLD ECONOMY
(2009), http://advancingwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Groundbreakers-Using-the
-strength-of-women-to-rebuild-the-world-economy-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBR3-KL
33]. The group’s diversity mattered as much as their ability and brainpower, if not more. For
example, homogenous groups “stake out extreme positions,” and often “limit [their]
discussions to a small number of alternative courses of action without surveying the full range
of alternatives.” Lisa Nicholson, Making In-Roads to Corporate General Counsel Positions:
It’s Only a Matter of Time?, 65 MD. L. REV. 625, 637 (2006). Therefore, diversifying boards
may mitigate a board’s tendency to conform, prevent groupthink, and promote board scrutiny
of decision-making. Ramirez, supra note 1, at 99.
132. Fisch, supra note 122.
133. Id. at 268; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (enacted to protect shareholders and the general public from accounting errors and
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more active role. It does not actually manage the firm, of course, but
may help guide strategy. Monitoring involves the assessment of
management efforts and managing duties, in which the board hires the
executive and assesses executive-driven, long-term strategy. 134 The
board oversees and approves the decisions made by the executive
committee and ensures that the work of the corporation follows a set
of rules, as in the central work of the audit committee.
Given what we know about boards, diversity will matter most
where boards matter most. The two dichotomies roughly map onto
each other: diversity (repetitive or creative work) and boards
(monitoring or managerial work). A monitoring board’s duties focus
more on the responsive work of evaluating executive proposals. On a
monitoring board, process may change thanks to diversity.135 Even in
a deferential board, women’s presence may add a methodical, nonconflictual style to board discussion that could change how boards
decide.136 On substance, however, it is rare for a board member, much
less an entire board, to vote against an executive proposal. Board
votes typically all lead to the same substantive outcome: approval. At
the extreme, some highly deferential boards simply rubber-stamp
whatever the executive puts before them, and on such boards, diversity
will matter little.137
By contrast, more active boards may assist in firm strategy
including assessing opportunities.138 The creative work of imagining
strategic opportunities may have boards move beyond their usual
passive role within firm governance. This is where diversity would
matter most. The line between monitoring and managing clearly will
have substantial gray areas, even within firms, especially over time.
fraudulent practices in the corporate enterprise); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (enacted to prevent the
excessive risk-taking that led to the 2008 financial crisis and improve accountability and
transparency in the United States financial system).
134. MACEY, supra note 121, at 52.
135. DHIR, supra note 32; see also Anita Williams Woolley et al., Evidence for a
Collective Intelligence Factor in the Performance of Human Groups, 330 SCIENCE 686, 688
(Oct. 29, 2010) (evidencing how the group intelligence factor was significantly and positively
correlated to the number of women in the group.).
136. See DHIR, supra note 32.
137. Sometimes this will be true, but sometimes deference by the board to management
can destroy shareholder value. Id.
138. Fisch, supra note 122, at 272. Indeed, because of this conflict, Macey argues the
United States places too much emphasis on the board’s role. MACEY, supra note 121, at 56.
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The more active the board, the more diversity might augment the
firm’s productivity.
Two factors increased the board’s role. First, market factors
after the 2008 financial crisis have increased the role boards play.
Boards must now also protect against extreme risk and demonstrate to
capital markets that the firm’s fortunes remain secure.139 As rubberstamping diminishes, and boards become more active, diversity’s
effects will grow. Second, independence, an increasingly valued
element in good governance, correlates to diversity. 140 Several of the
traits that make independent directors seem like they would improve
governance reflect the traits ascribed to women. 141 Independent
directors serve as a counterweight to the executive committee. 142
Independents can dissent, at least theoretically, without cost. 143
Diversity among independent directors may prove more valuable.144
The increase in independent and diverse directors on corporate boards

139. Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.
2002), https://hbr.org/2002/09/what-makes-great-boards-great [https://perma.cc/YE39-GNK
9]. Boards may meet more frequently or less depending on financial conditions.
140. “Agency theory suggests that CEOs may need independent oversight. If so, then
diversity of the board of directors and the subsequent conﬂict that is considered to commonly
occur with diverse group dynamics is likely to have a positive impact . . . .” Niclas L. Erhardt
et al., Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performances, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE
102, 108 (2003).
141. One skeptical reflection: it may just be a trope of sex difference that women will
act independently simply because they hold little responsibility for the pre-2008 boom years
due to low representation. One scholar noted that the crisis led firms to prefer experience to
diversity, driving them away from women. Fairfax, supra note 40, at 871 (citing Spencer
Stuart board index). Consequently, “the economic crisis appears to have narrowed the
criteria corporations use to identify board candidates, thereby limiting the ability of
corporations to engage in significant diversity efforts.” Fairfax, supra note 40, at 872.
Therefore, while women may have helped mitigate the effects of the financial crisis by
tending to be more risk averse, the financial crisis did not necessarily help women obtain
board positions.
142. DRAVIS, supra note 119, at 4 (“The independence of directors . . . is intended to
prevent certain types of management abuses of corporate resources.”); see also AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) (encouraging the use of independent directors).
143. Of course, as one interviewee noted, a “bum” can be an “independent director” in
that they too are independent. Interview 11M, in Paris, France.
144. The question of board interest capture by the executive may lead to conflicts of
interest. See MACEY, supra note 121, at 70-75 (arguing that the capture of the board by
executives is at the heart of corporate crises, including, notably, the Enron collapse.). Macey
next describes the Enron collapse, which “has become a metaphor for corporate governance
failure.” Id. at 79.
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reflects a growing trend in governance.
These two trends,
independence and more active boards, will increase diversity’s
value.145
Last, smaller firms and close corporations likely face different
issues with regard to diversity. Because of their smaller teams and
leaner staffing, their pursuit of diversity as a matter of good
governance might be less likely. If stakeholders in the close
corporation express interest in diversity, however, then it may end up
as a priority for the firm. Given the concentration of power typical of
smaller firms, good governance benefits stemming from diversity
would likely only arise if the principal shareholders value the inclusion
of diverse perspectives.
B. The Forest: Diversity of Firms

Corporate governance varies widely. Large and small firms,
start-ups, and well-established firms all differ substantially. Global
firms deploy different processes from national ones. Industries and
related risks diverge. This part focuses on four variables within firms:
firm type, ownership, age, and governance. Industry matters
substantially in terms of diversity. As women tend toward certain
courses of study, professions and industries reflect this dynamic. With
few women engineers, industries that rely heavily on this profession
tend to have fewer women. 146 For technology, aeronautics,
automobiles, utilities, construction, and other lines of business in
which engineering plays a dominant role in product development, the
low participation of women in the field affects diversity at all levels.
145. At the same time, the confluence of these changes would render an objective
assessment of diversity’s relevance more challenging.
146. Girls tend to veer away from science and engineering subjects. Susan Haag, et al.,
Barriers to Math and Science Classes and Careers: Gender Subject and Developmental
Differences, J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAV., 77, 361-73 (2010), https://www.researchgate.n
et/publication/268506506_Fouad_NA_Hackett_G_Smith_P_Haag_S_Spencer_D_2010_Bar
riers_to_Math_and_Science_Classes_and_Careers_Gender_Subject_and_Developmental_D
ifferences_J_of_Vocational_Behavior_77_361-373 [https://perma.cc/S24R-WLZ6]. This
leads to reduced participation in engineering as a profession. See, e.g., Nadya A. Fouad &
Romila Singh, Stemming the Tide: Why Women Leave Engineering, WOMEN IN ENGINEERING
2011 REPORT (2011), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/NSF_Stemming%20the%20Tide%20
Why%20Women%20Leave%20Engineering.pdf [https://perma.cc/QFE9-2Z3V] (revealing
that a workplace culture that is non-supportive of women causes female engineers to leave
the field.).
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In such industries, the paucity of women at most levels of the firm
reduces the potential pool of women who could serve on the board or
in the executive committee. Women form a larger proportion of
professionals in certain industries that involve sales, customer service,
human resources, and finance. The opposite is true in information
technology.147 The phenomenon of Sheryl Sandberg’s Lean In drew
attention to the lack of women in the high growth area of technology
as well as in other sectors.148 By contrast, luxury goods, cosmetics,
publishing, and other industries have far larger numbers of women.
Beyond management, women play a role as stakeholders, as both
workers and customers. In industries with large numbers of women
in these groups, management tends to be more inclusive.
Not only do certain industries tend toward more or less sex
diversity, but distinct industries require distinct governance. Consider
the distinctions among banks, technology, and heavy industry. 149
Banks and technology may have fewer environmental concerns, while
heavy industry may be subject to greater governmental intervention
and regulation. Although the markets that finance firm operations and
growth function on a global scale, some firms continue to focus on
distinct capital markets, which hold divergent expectations of firms.150
A firm’s age also plays a role. Newer firms have distinct
challenges and methods of grappling with them, while older firms tend
to have well-established infrastructures.151 Newer firms tend to take
147. Margaret Yap & Alison M. Konrad, Gender and Racial Differentials in Promotions:
Is There a Sticky Floor, a Mid-Level Bottleneck, or a Glass Ceiling?, 64 INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 593, 606 (2009).
148. See generally SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD
(Alfred A. Knopf 2013). For a structuralist critique of Sandberg’s manifesto, see Darren
Rosenblum, It’s Time for the State to ‘Lean In’ for Gender Equality, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.
14, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/darren-rosenblum/lean-in_b_2847554.html [http
s: //perma.cc/M88Z-T6QV].
149. Rohit Arora, Government Should Think Before Imposing Heavy Regulation on
Fintech, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 2, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/08/02/governmentshould-think-before-imposing-heavy-regulation-on-fintech/ [https://perma.cc/E9SX-Q8X6]
(referring to the question of how much regulation should the internet marketplace face in an
effort to highlight the severity of governmental control over other industries, including
banking).
150. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 73-74 (Janis Sarra ed.,
2003) (ebook).
151. It is worth noting that newly established corporations are arguably more innovative,
allowing them to make riskier decisions that well-established firms often refrain from making.
See Stefano Bianchini et al., Corporate Governance, Innovation and Firm Age: Insights and
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more risks for growth, while well-established firms that worry about
risks undermining established lines of business tend toward greater
risk aversion. Shareholder ownership constitutes another variable,
because firms may have very broad shareholder bases or a
concentrated ownership structure. 152 Those with a concentrated
structure may have a large presence of institutional investors or a
concentrated holding by family members. 153 Some large investors,
whether hedge funds, activist investors, or pension funds, exercise
control in how firms operate; others favor management’s exercise of
judgment, provided returns satisfy the owners. 154 Some firms have
shareholders from global capital markets; others have a concentration
from their home nation or region.155 Firms can also free themselves
from public regulation by privatizing.
Ownership matters immensely. In firms with a concentrated
ownership structure, the board will likely serve the owner’s interests.
That will prove true whether the owner is the founder or inventor, an
activist investor, a hedge fund, or even the state. Indeed, for firms
whose shareholders include the state, the rules imposed by the state
may be substantial. 156 The state may emphasize more stakeholderoriented decision-making or may insist on specific actions, such as
requiring a firm keep its plants open even if this decision runs counter
to the profit motive for the firm.157
New Evidence 1-2 (GREDEG Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. 2015-05, 2015).
152. Various firm characteristics inform the ideal shareholder base. See Anne Beyer et
al., Does the Composition of a Company’s Shareholder Base Really Matter?, STAN. CLOSER
LOOK SERIES (2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/42_ShareholderComp
osition.pdf [https://perma.cc/849A-KXXA].
153. Firms that value long-term investors typically prefer block shareholders that own
significant portions of stock. Id.
154. See generally Stuart Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder
Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55 (2007), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=959670 [https://perma.cc/VXF9-8ETT] (discussing first the fall in the institutional
shareholder’s role in corporate governance followed by the subsequent recent rise).
155. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 150, at 73
(noting that there are management-related tensions among those who invest, which naturally
influences the desired type of shareholders. A firm with a specific image, ideal, or mission
may prefer a global shareholder base or a shareholder base from its home region).
156. See, e.g., Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2935 (2012) (explaining that Brazil’s Corporations Law required
publicly traded mixed enterprises to consider the interests of employees, communities, and
the national economy in their decision-making).
157. See id. at 2921 (stating that in firms where the state has an ownership interest, control
mechanisms “tend to consistently favor the interests of the state as shareholder over those of
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Likewise, the profile of capital markets also affects
governance. In flush times, firms may extend more deference to the
executive. In times of crisis, when debt or equity markets are weak,
firms tend to retrench toward conservative positions that reduce risk
and preserve access to capital. Executives and boards alike will attend
to the demands of capital markets in their decision-making. Indeed, a
firm’s choices with regard to the board’s structure and power within
the firm may vary based on the risk profile the firm chooses. 158 In
crucial moments for firms in their relations with capital markets, they
may choose a more conservative route concerning diversity. For
example, Twitter caused a public uproar when it announced its Initial
Public Offering with an all-male board. The firm quickly found
Marjorie Scardino, whose elite credentials include Chairman of the
Board of the MacArthur Foundation.159 Twitter, it turned out, was too
large and prominent not to include a woman. Because the firm wanted
to avoid additional negative press, it found a woman. Thus, the
inclusion of at least one woman became an expectation, and the more
conservative route for larger firms.
Larger firms also have the wherewithal to hire international
search firms to find prominent diverse people. Within this context, the
inclusion of women on the board increasingly seems like a norm,
which places pressure on large United States firms to follow suit.160
Smaller, less visible firms face fewer pressures, as do firms with a
business-to-business model. Therefore, both may avoid substantial
consumer attention that may create pressure for diversity such as that
faced by Twitter.
Given the increase in board diversity, how do these various
kinds of firms affect board governance and, in turn, the diversity on
their boards? It comes down to which firms have the wherewithal to
choose how to diversify and which firms diversify unintentionally.
Large firms have the resources to find and attract diverse board
outside investors.”).
158. As one scholar suggests, the risk profile of a firm may be reduced by outsourcing the
board entirely. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2014).
159. Board of Directors, TWITTER, https://investor.twitterinc.com/directors.cfm
[https://perma.cc/J6XH-NJEC] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); Hayley Tsukayama, Twitter
Appoints First Woman, Marjorie Scardino, to Board of Directors, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2013.
160. Jennifer Bissel et al., Shake-up Calls Mount as Lack of Diversity on U.S. Boards
Laid Bare, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2016.
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members, whether their motivation draws on a desire for better
governance, or a fear of negative press, as with Twitter.
French firms are instructive, as they experienced an exogenous
pressure to include substantial numbers of women. A diversity gold
rush of sorts ensued as large firms moved out ahead of the more
numerous mid-size firms with fewer resources to find “competent”
women to fill their board seats.161 As large firms complied, though,
they tended to seek out the women whose competence reflected that
of the current members of the board. They looked for women with an
elite background and with executive experience.162 If French women
did not fit the bill – and few did, given the rarity of women executives
in France – firms looked abroad to fill their quota.163 These first-mover
firms may have brought on board precisely the women who would be
less likely to add new experiences, as their profiles matched that of
current board members.
The limited role of boards with regard to the executive
undergirds a strong skepticism about the instrumental value of
diversity. Perhaps proponents of instrumentalist diversity succeeded
with their efforts in the board context precisely because the board does
not play a large enough role to disrupt business if the diversity proves
ineffective. Even in some of the most egregious groupthink moments
in recent corporate history, it is not certain that diversity would have
prevented what occurred.164 However, as a thought experiment one
might wonder whether diversity would avert grave risks. One scholar
argued that had Enron included women on its board, it would have
averted disaster.165
161. CAC 40 firms had reached 75% compliance with the requirement in 2014, 30% of
all board members being female. Matt Orsagh, “Women on Corporate Boards: Global Trends
for Promoting Diversity”, MKT. INTEGRITY INSIGHTS (Sept. 14, 2014), https://blog
s.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2014/09/24/women-on-corporate-boards-global-trends-forpromoting-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/7MP7-FR4S].
162. Interview 9F, in Paris, France.
163. Interview with 19F, in Paris, France.
164. Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233, 1306-08 (2003). Toward the end of its existence, Enron counted one woman
among its seventeen board members. See Enron’s Board of Directors, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1,
2002, 10:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2002/feb/01/corporatefraud
.enron3 [https://perma.cc/7G58-ETMQ].
165. See id. More directly, others place the blame on outside firms such as Arthur
Andersen, or on the shareholder primacy as having facilitated Enron’s continued fraud. See
generally, David Millon, Who “Caused” the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309,
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More risk-averse people could help firms protect their income
sources through careful forethought, crisis management, and risk
reduction. The risk aversion ascribed to women may slow down
decisions, which market actors often find detrimental. For that reason,
women leaders may face pressure to take greater risks to succeed.166
When Patricia Dunn replaced the embattled Carly Fiorina at the head
of HP, she initiated an investigation that, when made public, gave rise
to an initial filing of felony charges.167 Dunn’s experience reveals the
fine line leaders of any sex must walk.
Which firms’ governance might benefit the most from
diversity? Among firms, we merely have to look for the factors that
suggest stronger governance. Dispersed shareholders may weigh less
heavily on a board, allowing diversity to matter. Firms with active
boards also create promising environments for diversity to matter.
Firms that view diversity opportunistically to improve their
governance will succeed, especially those that foster a critical mass of
diversity. By contrast, including women on firms with rubber-stamp
boards will have little effect on firm performance. Likewise, in firms
with a dominant shareholder, the board’s role could inevitably play a
smaller role in firm affairs. An example would be the technology
sector, where several of the founding members of firms continue to
dominate.
IV.

DIVERSITY OF NATIONALITIES

The question of “where” matters enormously. State and
national jurisdictions regulate firms and thus impact diversity’s
instrumental effect. The firm’s size and national/global profile
determines who populates its board, as the firm seeks to garner or
maintain the respect of its relevant capital markets.
The Brexit referendum and the Trump election have upended the
norm of trade liberalization with a push toward de-globalization. 168
320 (2003); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1287 (2002).
166. ACTING WHITE?, supra note 11.
167. See Miriam Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What Can We
Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 528 (2008) (citing
Dunn Submission, supra note 5 at 55–56).
168. See Martin Wolf, Britain’s Road to Becoming the EU’s Canada, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
20, 2018, 1:40 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/e72bf154-1566-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44
[https://perma.cc/ZM8C-CLEE].
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Both votes might radically change how multinational firms operate.
Subject to this uncertainty, the next part presumes that the status quo
of globalized firms will largely continue.
A. Law and Legal Culture Variations

The previous part addressed board variation and how it would
affect diversity. Variation in national origin among the members of
boards proves substantial. 169 National, regulatory, and cultural
distinctions run deep and interact with each other regarding diversity.
Firms develop governance cultures that respond to local, regional and
international capital market conditions as well as state regulatory
frameworks. Corporate legal frameworks vary substantially.170 Social
politics affect ownership structures and many other aspects of how
firms operate. Political economy determines corporate governance
systems, because it determines ownership, size, authority, and, in
particular, the division between ownership and control. 171 Some
politics are national, while others are regional. One scholar notes that
social democracy and diffuse ownership cannot coexist easily: social
democracy (here, in the European context) stabilizes the workforce,
while diffuse ownership favors shareholder primacy and maximizes
profit, a distinction reflected in left-right political alignments.172 In
social democracies the ties between shareholders and managers fray
and concentrated ownership functions best.173
To take but one example, several countries have tiered boards
and/or labor inclusion. In Germany, for example, co-determination
169. An admitted shortcoming of this piece is that the examples draw on the European
and United States context. Beyond those regions, board structures may vary further. I suspect
the question of good governance and owner domination resonates elsewhere.
170. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 142–45 (2003).
171. While economic development, technology, culture, or tax and legal structures are
important, social peace is a prerequisite for businesses to operate successfully. See id.
(“Before a nation can produce, it must achieve social peace.”). Without social peace there is
turmoil, which creates volatile markets.
172. Social democracies do not allow managers the discretion necessary to keep
stockholder profits up, which is vital to diffuse ownership goals. Ensuring that people are
working is a key goal of social democracies. In these political environments the government
creates a wedge between stockholders and managers by forcing firms to make decisions
favoring employees. See generally, id.
173. See generally, id.
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allocates half of all supervisory board seats to labor. Germany
requires tiered boards with an executive board that manages more
detailed strategic issues in addition to the supervisory board, which
performs functions closer to that of a United States board.174 Other
countries, such as France, require minimal labor representation. Labor
participation in boards increases stakeholder representation, and
clearly increases those boards’ class diversity. It may also bolster
other diversity. In an interview, a union representative on the board
articulated why he thought women would not change board decisions:
“If we go looking at Goldman Sachs, they would be biased toward
Goldman Sachs like a guy. . . They will function with their own
intelligence and sensibility and their experience, like a guy.”175 As he
implies, to the extent that a woman on the board will act “like a guy,”
her inclusion may not alter the board.
The German example raises another question related to
culture. German boards typically meet far less often than United States
boards, and board members receive documents for consideration upon
arrival at the meeting. In addition, German boards tend to be larger,
partly because of the co-determination requirement. As a result,
German boards tend to be less effective than U.S. boards at overseeing
firms. This lower level of efficacy means that diversifying German
boards might have less of an instrumental effect than it would in a
United States context.
This reality means that governance changes, including
diversity, will be unlikely to produce desired results unless the
regulatory environment and corporate governance systems align.176 If
the state regulates and the private sector resists, firms can prove very
effective at subverting the regulation. The widespread use of the
business case argument for board diversity in France led the private

174. Roe, supra note 170, at 71-73.
175. Interview with 5M, supra note 68.
176. Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate
Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000). “Where social democracy was strong, the public firm
was unstable, weak, and unable to dominate without difficulty; where social democracy was
weak, ownership diffusion of the large firm could, if other economic and institutional
conditions prevailed, begin.” Roe, supra note 170, at 6-7. That is not to say that countries
with social democracies cannot be utilitarian; because they do ensure stability for a larger
number of people. Id. at 7. However, Roe uses this information to theorize that there are
multiple roads to utilitarianism that must begin with social peace. Id. The idea that political
environment and structure of corporate governance are correlated need to be recognized by
policy-makers, especially with increasing globalization. Id.
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sector to willingly adopt this requirement as it largely viewed the
change as a salutary one. Even if it was designed to head off
regulation, this effort aligned the private sector with the efforts at
inclusion. When board members were questioned about compliance,
the universal answer was that firms would comply. Only one possible
noncompliance surfaced: firms might choose “marionettes” to join the
board – women who served as proxies on boards when the real
decision maker was someone else.
B. Regulatory Variation

Increased harmonization aside, corporate governance rules
vary widely, nationally or federally. 177 Firms may structure
themselves with different entities in other jurisdictions. Diversity
legislation differs enormously as other countries view inclusion as a
priority for legislation, in part perhaps to attain some democratic
legitimacy. 178 As this section suggests, diversity will make a
difference when regulations require the addition of women to boards.
This chart maps the remedies for corporate diversity adopted by
various countries since 2003, when Norway first adopted a quota for
women on boards.

177. See Roe, supra note 176. National contexts vary significantly in terms of regulatory
practices. Firms in developing markets pursue certain decisions that contrast with those in low
growth states with clearly established legal norms. Consider Walmart’s infamous violation
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Mexico. Walmart decided to locate its new superstore
within the boundaries of a historically protected area, but rather than shift its plans, the firm
bribed local authorities to change the boundaries of the area to suit their needs. This extreme
example reveals how radically business practices differ across national contexts. As
countries’ firms differ in ownership and age profiles, such aspects may blur into national
norms about firm behavior. Charlie Savage, With Wal-Mart Claims, Greater Attention on a
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012).
178. See Suk, supra note 106, at 450.
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Figure 3: National Legislation Compared179

These remedies range from fixed, government-imposed
remedies at the top, to more fluid and voluntary remedies at the
bottom. This spectrum of regulatory involvement pairs strong
regulation with fixed notions of sex identity – a belief that “men” and
“women” are distinct categories that will each contribute differently.
On the other end of the spectrum sits weaker regulation which allows
for a more fluid understanding of sex. 180 Harder quotas guarantee
women positions as they use a fixed meaning of “women.” In contrast,
firms like those in the U.S. set their own diversity metrics.181 This
range of legislative remedies demonstrates what states might do to
advance diversity and also how these measures relate to each other.
The skepticism about stereotypes discussed in Part I carries
through here – fixed remedies, such as the quotas in France and
Norway, reinforce the idea that gender identity is fixed by nature into
179. This chart appears in Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, The Effect of Gender
Diversity on Board Decision-Making: Interviews with Board Members and Stakeholders,
Conference Board (Jan. 2017), https://www.conference-board.org/publications/publicationde
tail.cfm?publicationid=7407 [https://perma.cc/6GVF-E63Q].
180. I borrow this structure from Jane Mansbridge who mapped political quotas in a
similar fashion. See Mansbridge, supra note 67.
181. Social norms may still lead to widespread use of the binary among firms, but the
lack of specificity in the regulation permits more fluid applications. Firms may typically
follow the binary but are not mandated to do so.
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a binary. 182 Regulation of gender diversity may vary by penalty or
duration – for example, some rules can include sunset provisions.183
Less-fixed remedies may demand fewer changes in firm culture, as
firms can self-enforce.184 Of the softer quotas, the United Kingdom
has the most substantial compliance.185 The United States stands in
182. As depicted here, any remedy for group inequality relies on some notions of essential
identity. Infra Part II. The move away from fifty percent reduces the fixed nature of the
remedy, even as the harder enforcement mechanism and the requirement of seats on boards
(and not just candidates as in the Parity law) increase this nature of the quota. In so doing, it
establishes a critical mass for each sex, but one that involves, what I have called, “gender
balance,” a less rigid means to improve representation than the fifty percent political quota.
Parité, Loi 99-569 du 8 juillet 1999 relative à l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes [Law
99-569 of July 8, 1999 regarding the Equality between Women and Men], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 9, 1999,
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=JUSX9800069L
[https://perma.cc/AW3T-WEZG] [hereinafter Loi 99-569]. Interestingly, Dhir’s Norwegian
interviewees reported that sex mattered in the boardroom, while my interviewees in France
reported otherwise. DHIR, supra note 32, at 101. It may be that the contexts define the board
members and that in a gender-progressive society, board members will be more progressive
on gender matters. One may also argue that Norwegian board members assert sex difference
does matter because in their society it does not matter (or matters much less than in the nonScandinavian world) whereas in France, the board members report sex does not matter (in
terms of substantive decisions) because in French society it actually does matter. Otherwise
stated, board members in Norway accept sex difference and incorporate it because it is an
accepted public policy framework, whereas in France it might raise questions about the
professionalism of the board members if they said that their sex defined their choices. In this
sense, the professional norm in France may be closer to the U.S. context, where evaluating
firm choices must draw on what board members perceive to be objective market criteria. See
id. at 101-147. This self-reporting may reflect the interviewees’ sense of professional norms
within their country which permit the recognition of gender’s role in Norway, but less so in
more-traditional France.
183. Temporality is another factor in fixedness. Some quota statutes include mandatory
sunset provisions, which render them less fixed. Variations also exist on how hard or soft the
remedies are. The Norwegian quota contains the most draconian of punishments – dissolution
of the firm’s corporate status. DHIR, supra note 32, at 105. Spain’s law is softer – although
it obliges an increase in board participation to forty percent, there are no formal sanctions for
failure. U.K. DEP’T FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, WOMEN ON BOARDS (2011).
Spain’s 2007 quota requires public companies and IBEX 35-quoted firms with more than 250
employees to attain a minimum forty percent share of each sex on their boards by 2015, but
there are no formal sanctions for companies that do not reach this quota. Id.
184. Term limits, for example, might promote turnover and the potential inclusion of
women without a focus on identity, as I will explore in a subsequent project.
185. The U.K. has a voluntary suggestion of thirty percent for boardrooms. Italy has a
boardroom quota of one third, Belgium’s is thirty percent, and Netherlands has a thirty percent
“nonbinding target.” Alison Smale & Claire Cain Miller, Germany Sets Gender Quota in
Boardrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/world/europe
/german-law-requires-more-women-on-corporate-boards.html [https://perma.cc/K532-JS2V]
; Claire Cain Miller, Women on Boards: Where the U.S. Ranks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2015,
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contrast to continental Europe in resisting a focus on sex diversity.
The S.E.C., as noted above, allows firms to define diversity. 186
Legislative action on women’s inclusion in the U.S. seems unlikely,
given the historical focus on remedying racial inclusion and
accounting for diversity more broadly.187
The greatest benefits of diversity might be seen in firms with
high levels of willing compliance and in countries that foster a critical
mass of diversity. Firms will then seek to implement such provisions
in ways most beneficial to their own governance.
C. Regulating Culture & Gender

Gender itself varies substantially from country to country.188
Socioeconomic factors such as labor participation, reproductive rights,
and childcare access construct power differentials between men and
women. Familial roles permit or bar work outside the home. 189
Workforce participation affects women’s leadership across national
lines.190 In countries with less gender equality, remedies that force
inclusion may confront more resistance.191
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/upshot/women-on-boards-where-the-us-ranks.html
[https://perma.cc/5VHK-WD64].
186. See supra Part I.A.
187. See generally Jane Mansbridge, The Descriptive Political Representation of Gender:
An Anti-Essentialist Argument, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL
REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 19 (Sytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier
eds., 2001) (describing the prioritization of other causes over gender parity).
188. Darren Rosenblum, Internalizing Gender: Why International Law Theory Should
Adopt Comparative Methods, 45 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 759 (2007) [hereinafter
Internalizing Gender].
189. Within the European context, see generally Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and
Fundamentalism in the Application of German Abortion Laws, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY:
GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009) (emphasizing how
gender has a different meaning in Germany, in part drawing on the historical focus on
motherhood in the role of women).
190. Those same variations exist across many national lines. One element that creates
these distinctions is family structures. Access to family planning and abortion affect how
people of different sexes experience their gender, daycare, public education, and healthcare.
In social democracies, families often have more security on these elements, freeing women to
work more. For example, French women benefit from extensive social services as compared
to United States women.
191. For example, a multinational firm adding a woman to a Japanese subsidiary’s board
may yield challenges given the low number of women in such positions. See Jiji, Women
Account for 5.1% of Executives at Large Japanese Firms, Survey Shows, JAPAN TIMES (July
27, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/27/business/women-account-5-1-
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Contrasting the quota laws of Norway and France provides an
example of how political, legal, and cultural realities affect the
implementation of a diversity remedy. In 2003, Norway adopted a
quota requiring each sex to comprise at least forty percent of a
corporate board, and achieved near-universal compliance in 2008.192
In 2010, France adopted a quota similar to Norway’s, requiring boards
to adhere to the same floor of forty percent by 2017. Since France’s
adoption, several other European countries have followed suit, notably
Germany. 193 Likewise, the European Union has been debating
whether to adopt a quota that encourages or imposes a requirement on
firms within its borders.194
The French legislation drew inspiration from Norway’s efforts.
The core component of Norway’s quota sets a clear floor and ceiling
for either sex, extending Norway’s long history of gender balance
advancement. 195 Norway instituted the quota as a corporate
governance requirement, with a threat of dissolution for
executives-large-japanese-firms-survey-shows/#.WtZIg9PwbHo [https://perma.cc/6YYN-U
MLN].
192. DHIR, supra note 32, at 104-05; see also Nicola Clark, Getting Women Into
Boardrooms, by Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/world
/europe/28iht-quota.html [https://perma.cc/R66R-S3K8] (explaining that Norway adopted a
quota in 2003).
193. Smale & Miller, supra note 185.
194. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, POSITIVE ACTION MEASURES TO ENSURE FULL EQUALITY IN
PRACTICE BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN, INCLUDING ON COMPANY BOARDS (2012) (detailing
gender equality goals and proposing legal measures to achieve those goals in the EU); James
Kanter, E.U. Considers Quotas for Women in Boardrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/business/global/eu-considers-quotas-for-women-inboardrooms.html [https://perma.cc/8HLL-J5LA] (reporting on a 2012 gender quota proposal
in the European Union). Given that the United Kingdom has resisted such targets, their
withdrawal from the European Union may open the way for a more assertive remedy.
195. Danuta Tomczak, Gender Equality Policies and Their Outcomes in Norway, 4
ZARZĄDZANIE PUBLICZNE 379, 380-83 (2016). When the law passed in 2003, women’s
participation in government leadership and civil society approached parity, but female
representation on boards was below ten percent. This reflected, as some assert, the
predominantly socialist orientation of the feminist movement, which led to women’s
reluctance to participate in capital, perhaps viewed as the “enemy,” as well as lower levels in
private sector work by women as compared to state sector employment. Carrie Seim Medill,
Closing the Corporation Gender Gap, 60 NEWS OF NORWAY 8 (2003). The 1978 Gender
Equality Act, amended in 2002, emphasized equal opportunities in education, employment,
and cultural and professional advancement. See Press Release, Comm. on Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Norway Called ‘Haven for Gender Equality,’ as Women’s
Anti-Discrimination Committee Examines Reports on Compliance with Convention, U.N.
Press Release WOM/1377 (Jan. 20, 2003) (describing Norway as a country standing at the
forefront of combating discrimination against women).
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noncompliance, leading to near-complete compliance by the 2008
deadline. 196 This quota reflects a compelling linkage between the
public and private sectors. It signals a commitment to combat
entrenched inequality by increasing both women’s role in the
corporate sector and men’s role in the family.197 Although France has
led in gender equality, Norway’s efforts prove more comprehensive.198
France’s economy substantially outranks that of Norway, a
factor that affects implementation.199 The French followed Norway’s
196. The law covers state-owned limited liability companies, state-owned enterprises,
companies incorporated by special litigation, inter-municipal companies, and privatelyowned public limited liability companies, of which there are about 500 on the Norwegian
stock exchange. Norway Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, Fact Sheet: The
Legislation on Representation of Both Sexes in Boards, https://web.archive.org/web/201509
21004531/https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/nfd/contact/press-centre/fact-sheets/factsheet-the-legislation-on-representa/id641431/ [https://perma.cc/3XAZ-DR37] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2018); see Loving Gender Balance, supra note 39, at 2879.
197. Scandinavian nations consistently earn top rankings in terms of economic
competition and technological prowess, but they simultaneously maintain a particularly
socialist form of democracy with health, education, and unemployment benefits, as well as
retirement and parental leave. Loving Gender Balance, supra note 39, at 2879; see also DHIR,
supra note 32. Norway’s major political parties have forty percent minimum quotas for both
sexes on electoral lists, some dating back to 1975. Norway, QUOTA PROJECT: GLOBAL
DATABASE OF QUOTAS FOR WOMEN, http://www.quotaproject.org/country/norway#party
[https://perma.cc/VWL5-QY77] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); Press Release, supra note 195.
198. France has a very mixed record on sex equality, with extensive formal equality but
broader exclusion of women from leadership and relatively feminized home work. Caroline
Lambert, French Women in Politics: The Long Road to Parity, BROOKINGS INST. (May 1,
2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/french-women-in-politics-the-long-road-to-parity
/ [https://perma.cc/WD85-LWUW]; see also Ariane Pailhé & Anne Solaz, Employment and
Childbearing: Women Bear the Burden of the Work-family Balance, 426 POPULATION &
SOC’YS 1 (2006) (reporting that the number of non-working women in France tends to
increase with the number of births because their working careers are more affected by
childbirth than those of men). Women’s participation in the labor market is also lower than
in Norway, as are other indices of sex equality. The Current Situation of Gender Equality in
France: Country Profile 2013, European Commission Directorate-General for Justice and
Consumers, (2013). In order to pass this quota, France required a constitutional amendment
as the quota violated its constitutional norms against treating citizens differently. Loi 2008724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernization des institutions de la Ve République [Law 2008-724
of July 23, 2008 on the Modernization of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 24, 2008,
Article 1, art 1; Martin A. Rogoff, Fifty Years of Constitutional Evolution in France: The
2008 Amendments and Beyond, 6 JUS POLITICUM 22-24, 59 (2011).
199. Norway is a very wealthy but small country – its economy does not have the wide
corporate diversity of larger economies. France is the world’s fifth largest economy and its
corporate sector is quite broad and increasingly globalized. Recent market capitalizations
reflect this difference: Norway’s publicly traded shares float for $193B, INDEXMUNDI,
https://www.indexmundi.com/norway/market_value_of_publicly_traded_shares.html
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forty percent, and, like Norway, drew inspiration from notions of
critical mass;200 however, they did not threaten firms with dissolution
– they instead decided that board decisions made without a compliant
board would have no legal force.201
One minor rule in corporate governance resulted in a large
impact on the implementation of the French quota. French law allows
board members to serve on a maximum of four boards, whereas
Norway does not limit board participation. Norwegian companies
repeatedly selected the same small group of women, pejoratively
referred to as “golden skirts.” Reports suggest that this effect should
dissipate as more women become available for board work.202 Women
coming from the same pool of people have less diversity of experience
to contribute. French firms, in contrast, searched further, both because
of the sheer number of women needed and because of the limit on
board participation. They could not limit themselves to a small set of
elite women. Many firms selected foreign women, “killing two birds
with one stone,” as interviewees said.203 This confirms the conclusion
that the French quota fostered newness on boards – French firms went
out of network to fill their positions, whereas Norwegian firms did
not. 204 If this analysis of forcing turnover proves correct, one may
argue that France’s quota led to a better result thanks to the four-board
limit. This distinction surfaces despite the fact that both France and
Norway have socially democratic regimes, which reminds us of the

[https://perma.cc/EBZ5-DUQN], while France’s are valued at $2T. INDEXMUNDI,
https://www.indexmundi.com/france/market_value_of_publicly_traded_shares.html
[https://perma.cc/YKE8-J354] (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
200. This figure follows Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s notion of critical mass as the arbiter for
when the voice of a member of a minority group would matter in a body dominated by a
majority group. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed
Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 966, 988 (1977).
201. French law followed a previously established quota for political representation,
Parité, adopted in 2000, which requires half of all candidates for public office be women. Loi
99-569, supra note 182.
202. In Norway then, women were overtaxed and perhaps less prepared. This may explain
the part of Amy Dittmar’s study of the Norwegian quota which concluded that firm values
dipped after the quota’s implementation because of the inclusion of less experienced board
members. Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact
on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 137 (2012).
203. See Interview with 19F.
204. See Interview with 1M, supra note 71.
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necessity for rigorous comparative method to prevent the facile
import/export of diversity remedies.205
Thanks to the aggressive European sex quotas, women’s
representation on boards grew immensely. Quotas created a new
normal in which boards now typically include some women. Even in
the United States, where regulatory government mandates are
unlikely, firms increasingly face public pressure to include women, as
evidenced in the Twitter controversy.206
Considering the three factors – the woman, the firm, and the
state, we may speculate where the greatest instrumental value will
surface. In countries where national boards have strong governance
structures with a critical mass of women firms may see the largest
benefit. It seems no such place exists; it would need to combine the
governance typical in the United States context with the regulatory
initiatives more typical in the European context. The next decade will
provide substantial opportunities to research which governance model
advances diversity most – those that target diversity advances or those
that do not – and whether instrumental benefits result for these firms.
V.

HYPOTHETICALS

This Part fits each factor with the others in regard to
instrumental benefits. These examples explore how firms may
maximize diversity’s utility. While stakeholders who benefit from
diversity include the state and society, this assessment focuses on
concrete firm benefits such as profits or improved governance.
Firms account for opportunity and risk in the near, medium, and long
205. Internalizing Gender, supra note 188.
206. Looking at Norway and France from the perspective of the United States reminds us
of some crucial contrasts. Quotas may be far less likely to arise in the United States partially
because of the attitudes toward law reflected toward compliance. It also may relate to the
lack of a corporatist history in the United States or the presence of a dispersed ownership base.
The focus on sex to the exclusion of other identity concerns raises serious doubts across the
political spectrum in the United States. Finally, the Unites States’ federal structure means
that such a provision has to arise in a particular corporate jurisdiction. It would be unlikely
that Delaware would adopt such a provision for fear of trampling on the discretion of the firms
incorporated there. The federal government could choose to intervene, but it seems unlikely
given the nature of the SEC’s involvement in diversity provision. Its deliberate vagueness
conveys the political tension that would surface should the SEC or some other body propose
an actual quota. Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”:
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 736-37 (2003);
Sheryl L. Wade, “We Are An Equal Opportunity Employer”: Diversity Doublespeak, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541 (2004). See supra Part III.B.
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term, and may wish to do so with regard to diversity should there be
a “diversity dividend.” This Part provides practical hypothetical
examples where different women might affect decision-making,
leading to a potential instrumental benefit.
A. Factor One: Identity Variation

Imagine one core variation between two hypothetical
individuals: Anne and Barbara. Firm A in Country A brings Anne to
serve on their board. Anne’s professional experience mirrors that of
Firm A’s board members – she went to elite schools, served as an
executive, and never took parental leave. At the same time, Barbara
joins the board of Firm A in Country A. Barbara’s background
followed a more traditionally female trajectory – she led the human
resources department and took parental leave. Most firms would
presume Anne brings the most value. But if we consider how diverse
experience trumps identity in creating value, Barbara will prove the
better choice. While both women may diversify the board, Barbara’s
perspective, if the rest of the board listens, will allow the board to use
more analytical tools and consider more information than it previously
did. Anne will add another mind similar to the minds already in the
room.
Expertise and experience matter most. Work experience may
come from within the industry of a specific firm or in diverse
industries. One may hold the same function in various industries, such
as finance, law, or human resources. One may also have prior board
work that enriches one’s expertise. Having an industry-specific
background may lend credibility to a board member’s opinions. Other
expertise distinctions also matter. For example, people with a
background in a firm’s profit center, as opposed to an area such as
human resources, express opinions that often carry more weight. We
can imagine that someone with a finance background would command
respect on financial matters in any firm she serves; however, her
authority might shift in industrial firms or in firms where the financial
issues raise distinct questions. Through new experiences one develops
expertise. A woman with a particular expertise, say in automobiles,
will demonstrate more authority in an industrial firm than in a
technology firm, at least in the beginning of her board service. Thus,
someone with varied industry experience contributes differently to
each board.
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Other relevant factors include language, which may matter
more in some firms than others, 207 and personality, which most
resembles and legitimizes the notion of fit. On boards where members
relate in a freewheeling fashion, an assertive personality influences
people. On other more civil or formal boards, a very assertive woman
may come across as a “bitch,” to use the term of one of the male board
members.208 In such a context, a less direct argument proves more
persuasive; a pensive or introverted woman may hold more sway than
a more direct one.
Women, constitute a new minority within the firm’s board.
Differences surface among individuals in a male majority and a female
minority. Within the French context, even within a business context,
male/female relations often involve more explicit gendered
performance including traditional forms of chivalry and flirtation,
both of which raise eyebrows as unprofessional in many United States
firm contexts.209
207. In the U.S. we rarely consider this factor, but in other markets language is a
considerable issue. Firms historically operate in their local languages but may move beyond
this choice to incorporate other market actors – typically incorporating English. In my
interviews in France, there was a wide range of language practices on boards. Some
interviewees reported French was the exclusive language and English speakers required
translation. See Interview with 11M, supra note 143; Interview with 19F, supra note 163.
Others reported that boards switched meetings to English and then switched back to French
after a while. Interview with 28M, in Paris, France. Depending on one’s comfort level in the
language used on the board, one might prove more or less persuasive given the nuances of
expression.
208. Interview with 28M, supra note 207.
209. Interview with 15F, in Paris, France. Although not dispositive, to draw on one
example from our study, more than one interviewee reported chivalry affected discussion. “If
there are two people who raise their hands and it happens that one is a man and the other is a
woman, the man will systematically propose that the woman should speak first . . . it’s the
rule of normal French chivalry, I don’t know if it would apply elsewhere.” Id. This reflection
points to the fact that different kinds of femininity may wield influence while others may
diminish it. Certainly, the interviewee who described his fellow board member as a “bitch”
was likely reacting not only to her assertiveness, but also to the way in which her demeanor
eschewed a traditionally feminine approach to wielding influence. On every board, certain
kinds of people hold sway while others may not. Even in a U.S. context where these kinds of
gender and sexual tensions are more latent, subconscious judgments shift in the wake of a
woman’s appropriate use of her femininity. Related to subconscious frameworks for
influence, variation among other difference lines affects one’s ability to persuade – class, sex
and gender expression, race, age, location, and network are crucial factors for fitting in within
a board context and holding influence. Surprisingly, class may vary substantially on boards,
albeit within a comfortable framework – old money versus new money. Although most board
members in the U.S. and Europe are white, it is important to note the role this commonality
must play in terms of cohesion and diversity. Age also varies, as women often constitute
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B. Factor Two: Firm Variation

To examine firm differences further, consider two examples:
Caroline and Delphine. Caroline built her own startup with two
college classmates. Her background reflects elite credentials, but her
international education and entrepreneurial experience differentiates
her from many board members. Delphine’s profile matches
Caroline’s, but she built a risk-averse reputation through work over
the past five years on the boards of two United States firms, in both of
which she served on the audit committee.
Firms B, C, and D have considered inviting Caroline to join
their boards. Firm B holds a well-established position in media
markets, and benefits a dispersed ownership with a strong board. Firm
C’s position as a relatively new technology company means its
concentrated ownership dominates a relatively passive board. Firm D
is an established and successful automobile manufacturer with a large
market share and a formalized business model. It may be hard to say
which firm suits Caroline’s skill set best. In one sense, her
entrepreneurial experience adds something new to Firm B, and her
voice may have weight in firm decision-making. On the other hand,
Caroline, like Firm C, understands new businesses’ needs. Other
board members may also have similar experiences, and with a passive
board, Caroline may have little impact there. In short, her experience
may matter most where it brings a new perspective in a place where
that perspective will matter.
If Delphine joins on the board of Firm C, the technology firm,
her risk aversion might not have much effect. At Firm B, the public
media company, however, Delphine may prove more influential,
given the firm’s more established industry. If conditions shift, such as
financial challenges from threats in established markets, Delphine’s
influence may spike in either Firm B or D. In such circumstances, the
more closely her specific industry knowledge relates to that of the firm
on whose board she sits, the greater her influence. Such a profile may
aid her effort to assert a more risk-averse profile on the firm.
Another corporate trait, firm ownership, affects diversity’s
value. Firms with a dominant owner often pursue a strategy consistent
with the owner’s interests, so Delphine’s risk aversion might only play
younger board members. School networks often matter most – once inside a network,
differences within the network may appear less prominent.
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a role when consistent with the owner’s interests. The relationship
between a firm and the state also matters – whether the state relates to
the firm as a client, an active regulator, or a distant regulator. Each of
these profiles matters in terms of the board’s role within the firm, and
consequently the influence of particular diverse board members.
Caroline and Delphine may contribute differently to firms
depending on their age. Since new firms typically resist a risk-averse
strategy, Caroline might swim with the tide and Delphine against it.
However, all firms change direction, and a new firm with a very strong
market position might seek a risk-averse strategy to maintain its
dominant position. A board for a slow-growth company typically
faces a reduced number of strategic decisions, unless the firm faces
extensive regulation or scrutiny.
Imagine if Firm D were gaming emissions tests to report higher
fuel efficiency, as Volkswagen did in 2015. 210 Although it cannot
serve as causal proof, the supervisory board lacked diversity and the
management board was staffed entirely by men.211 Ferdinand Piëch,
grandson of Ferdinand Porsche, ran the supervisory board. In 2012,
the board named his fourth wife, Ursula, former governess to Piëch’s
twelve children, to the board.212 In Ursula’s place, a woman such as
Delphine would challenge the executive, or might insist on a thorough
210. The 2015 Volkswagen scandal revealed up to 11 million cars worldwide loaded with
illegal software that falsified emissions data. Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack Ewing, Volkswagen to
Pay $14.7 Billion to Settle Diesel Claims in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016). With the twotier board structure, typical of the German system, it is unusual that Volkswagen’s
malfeasance went without notice; however, the supervisory board was composed of outsiders,
many of whom were part of the controlling families and other related individuals. Charles M.
Elson, Professor of Finance and Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate
Governance at the University of Delaware, noted that Volkswagen’s governance “was a
breeding ground for scandal,” and “[i]t was an accident waiting to happen.” James B. Stewart,
Problems at Volkswagen Start in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015). The firm’s
peculiar hybrid of “family control, government ownership and labor influence” played a role
in the scandal. Id. In 2012, Ferdinand Piëch, head of the company’s supervisory board,
managed to get his admittedly unqualified wife, a former kindergarten teacher, a position on
the board. Id. The position, filled based on shareholder voting, was secured despite protests
that the Piëch and Porsche families own over half of the company’s voting shares. Id. The
supervisory boardroom is described, by Professor Elson, as “an echo chamber”: a place where
“[o]utside views rarely penetrate.” Id. Some blame over-influence of labor over the firm’s
decisions, which favored employment over long-term prospects. Richard Milne, Germany’s
two-tier governance system comes under fire, FIN. TIMES (May 9, 2007).
211. Chris Bryant & Richard Milne, Boardroom politics at heart of VW scandal, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/e816cf86-6815-11e5-a57f-21b88f7d973f
[https://perma.cc/NZW6-ZN9Y].
212. Stewart, supra note 210.
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process which could have revealed the deception before it damaged
the firm. Delphine would have used her extensive business
background to protect the firm more effectively from executive
overreaching than the fourth Mrs. Piëch, a contrast that underscores
the value of experience over identity. This situation suggests a
potential cost of a lack of critical mass.
C. Factor Three: National Variation

For this factor, imagine hypothetical board member Elodie was
educated in France and the United States and served as an executive
in both countries in established luxury sector companies. Where will
Elodie’s contributions matter most? Being one woman on an
otherwise all-male board may hamper full participation. Studies on
critical mass reflect that below a third, minorities may feel constrained
by the reality or perception that the majority scrutinizes the minority
board member. France’s quota forces firms to include a critical mass
of women, while many United States boards may have only one. A
critical mass will improve Elodie’s ability to share her views –
particularly those involving experiential diversity – leading the firm to
benefit from the inclusion of a different voice on the board. Within a
firm like Wynn Resorts, for example, with one woman board member,
one can imagine she might have been self-conscious and that could
have hampered her assertiveness about her experiential difference.
Given how common it is for firms to have only one woman on
their board, the sidelining of such pioneers comes as no surprise. For
example, Liz Dolan served on the board of Quiksilver, the sports
clothing manufacturer, and resigned in 2015 after claiming bias from
the male board members. She stated: “. . . I learned . . . that even when
a woman earns a seat at the table, the men can put you in a soundproof
booth.”213 Therefore, even if a woman brings a unique perspective, she
might lack influence. On the other hand, some “pioneer” interviewees

213. Liz Dolan, Gender Bias Forced Me to Quit Quiksilver’s Board, FORTUNE (June 15,
2015) (explaining how she felt that the other directors excluded her from crucial discussions
and votes on whether to oust the now-former CEO of Quiksilver based on the biased
assumption that, as a woman, she would vote to keep the CEO in power, as she had a previous
professional relationship with him); Joann S. Lublin, Quicksilver Director Exits Amid Spat,
WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2015).
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reported that, as outsiders, they received substantial respect from the
boards on which they served.
Other jurisdiction-specific factors favor the inclusion or
exclusion of stakeholder values, which some studies ascribe to
women. 214 Imagine a U.S. woman, Fanny, who does favor
stakeholder interests, and place her within similar firms, but alter the
national contexts. Say she serves on the boards of two competitor
firms similarly situated in their markets, but operating out of different
national contexts: German and British. As Mark Roe noted, firms in
social democracies tend to adhere to the social contract for a variety
of reasons, while firms in liberal democracies pursue choices that
promote shareholder value.215 Germany’s social democratic context –
which requires union representation on boards – may provide Fanny
with a better environment to voice her concerns, while a British firm
may continue to direct the firm toward shareholder value
maximization. National corporate cultures do influence firm choices,
but they do not predetermine every outcome. Firms in more liberal
economies may choose more stakeholder-oriented strategies to claim
worker or customer loyalty. Despite her United States background and
stakeholder orientation, Franny’s ability to engage with issues
involving labor in a firm in a social democracy might be more limited
than someone whose principal career arose within a social democracy
context. This difference may prove fruitful in the context of a firm
trying to expand into a different realm.
Last, with regard to jurisdiction, this discussion focused on
national differences, but we also should note that in federal contexts,
wide variations may arise within one country. The federal overlay of
legislation makes differences between one state and another within the
United States relatively minor. Therefore, distinctions between states
will only affect certain firms. Some states allow public benefit
214. “Existing studies provide inconclusive evidence of the benefit, from a shareholder
value perspective, of increasing the number of women and ethnic and racial minorities on
public company boards.” Solan, supra note 37, at 919 (citing Sabina Nielsen et al., Board
Diversity and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of the Mediating Effects of
Board Processes and Task Performance (Acad. of Mgmt. Proceedings, No. 14,474, 2008),
available at http://www.ebscohost.com/academic .business-source-premier [https://perma.cc/
BA6G-276J] (accessible through fee-based membership); see also Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard
Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance,
27 J. CORP. L. 231, 231-34 (2002) (discussing the lack of evidence for the benefit of
independent board members)).
215. See Roe, supra note 176, at 27-38.
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corporations or give more rights to close corporation shareholders.
These distinctions affect how board members operate within a
particular context.
These six hypothetical women present a variety of traits of
individuals, firms, and jurisdictions to articulate the kinds of more
precise questions one may pose about diversity’s instrumentality.
CONCLUSION

Even deft market actors may find themselves maladroit in
responding to diversity and inclusion demands. The utopic overreach
of instrumental arguments does not help guide firms who require
concrete data on the actual value of women on boards. Therefore,
substantial context is necessary to assess how firms may realize
diversity benefits. Three contextual factors will determine the
existence and magnitude of the instrumental benefit. Factor One
considers whether and how traits ascribed to women actually connect
to women, who may not conform to stereotype. Factor Two shows
how firms and board governance vary enormously. Factor Three
places these elements of the individuals and the firms in the national
and global contexts. Methodical study that accounts for these contexts
would likely show that firms with strong board governance in
countries whose regulations foster inclusion would gain the most
benefits from diversity.
Further theoretical work links social science studies on sex
difference to the specific context of corporate leadership where
diversity must be analyzed beyond stereotypes. What kinds of
experiential diversity contribute the most to improved decisionmaking? For example, does women’s more regular caretaking
actually lead them to risk aversion and/or stakeholderism? Does the
social science on caretakers and risk aversion extend to the
boardroom?216 Does women’s greater caretaking experience link to
board decisions in favor of stakeholder values, like firing fewer
staff?217 Does the “methodical” nature of women reflect something
about women or is it related to their newness on the board as they try
hard to succeed. Does their methodical approach produce a lasting
increase in care on the board?

216. Seeung Jung et al., supra note 68; Byrnes et al., supra note 87.
217. A Female Style in Corporate Leadership, supra note 82.
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As more women join boards, quantitative and qualitative
research can evaluate whether women’s work on boards actually
reflects these traits. Research can demonstrate if and how firms benefit
from inclusion. Between the close contextualization urged in this
Article and the bias toward positive results, one may despair about the
actual potential for reliable research in this area. One response is to
emphasize normative arguments. Another is to insist that we not
displace normative anxiety into a lack of methodological rigor.
As European countries lead the world toward legislated
inclusion of women on boards, contextually accurate work is more
urgent than ever. In the wake of recent corporate sexual harassment
scandals, firms can no longer deny the immediacy of diversity and
inclusion imperatives. Across the public/private divide, leaders,
legislators, and regulators, as well as industries and firms are deciding
whether and how to act. Their crafting of remedies demands rigorous
studies on the actual benefits of diversity.

